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CORRECTING FEDERALISM MISTAKES 
IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:  
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
DAVID S. SCHWARTZ* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Can the U.S. Supreme Court correct a major federalism mistake of its own 
creation?  Should it?  The current judicial treatment of the Federal Arbitration 
Act1 (FAA) is an embarrassment to a Court whose majority is supposed to be 
leading a federalism revival, if not a federalism revolution.2  In 1984, in South-
land Corp. v. Keating,3 the Court held that the FAA is substantive federal law 
that preempts state laws regulating arbitration agreements.  The Court thereby 
transformed a quaint, sixty-year-old procedural statute into “a permanent, 
unauthorized eviction of state-court power to adjudicate a potentially large 
class of disputes,”4 as well as an eviction of state lawmaking power over the tra-
ditional state domain of contract law.  Even worse, Southland preempts this 
area of traditional state regulation without the justification of any strong federal 
interest.  Despite its constant, talismanic repetition, the “national policy favor-
ing arbitration”5 is illusory and is highly dubious federalism.  What significant 
federal interest is at stake in a state’s policy choice between opening its courts 
to litigants or compelling them to arbitrate pursuant to private contracts? 
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 1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000). 
 2. See Richard H. Fallon, The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Deci-
sions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002) (“Commentators unhesitatingly refer to a federalism ‘revival.’  
Law reviews echo with discussion of whether the Court has yet achieved, or is likely to effect, a feder-
alism ‘revolution.’”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7 
(2001). 
 3. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 4. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 5. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10. 
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Southland is anomalous in several respects.  It creates the only federal cause 
of action that gives rise to no federal-question jurisdiction and affects no sub-
stantive rights.  And while the Rehnquist “federalism-revival” Court has reaf-
firmed and extended Southland’s intrusion on state lawmaking autonomy, it 
may be that no Justice on that Court believes Southland was correctly decided: 
no member of the Southland majority remained on the Court as of 1994, and 
five current members of the Court have at one time or another dissented from 
Southland or a case applying it.  With four federalist Justices on record against 
it, a fifth who by rights should be, and at least one against it from the “liberal” 
wing of the Court, why does Southland remain?  Justice Stevens has suggested 
that, while contrary to congressional intent, the Southland preemption rule is 
supported, at least up to a point, by “intervening developments” in the law since 
1925.6  Justice O’Connor, while continuing to believe that Southland is wrong, 
nevertheless has “acquiesced” in reaffirming it in deference to the “special 
force” of stare decisis in statutory interpretation cases.7  And finally, at least 
some Justices—perhaps a majority—find the decision justified in retrospect by 
the “national policy favoring arbitration” that Southland largely created.8 
But Southland is wrong, and the justifications for it are wrong.  Part II of 
this Article outlines the Southland decision and shows how its preemption rule 
comes at a very high cost to the federalism values espoused by the Court in its 
recent federalism jurisprudence.  Part III argues that Southland was wrong from 
the outset as a matter of black-letter preemption doctrine.  Because preemption 
is a matter of congressional intent, the Court should have been guided by the 
persuasive historical record that Congress never intended the FAA to preempt 
state law.  The historical case against FAA preemption is even stronger than 
has been articulated in past dissenting opinions or scholarly accounts. 
Parts IV through VI consider the alternative justifications for adhering to 
Southland and argue that none is adequate.  Part IV considers whether South-
land’s acknowledged departure from congressional intent nevertheless can be 
accepted as “dynamic” statutory interpretation—that is, the theory that statutes 
may be broadly or loosely construed to serve pressing policy concerns not 
anticipated by the original drafters.9  Neither of the two public policy concerns 
argued in Southland itself—the prevention of forum shopping and “the national 
policy favoring arbitration”—justify the undermining of federalism values 
implicit in broad federal preemption.  Both policies are illusory in light of the 
Court’s established view that arbitration agreements are simply a specialized 
type of forum-selection clause having no impact on substantive outcomes.  
From a federalism perspective, it is constitutionally problematic, if not plainly 
unconstitutional, for Congress (or “Congress” as a cat’s paw for the Supreme 
 
 6. 465 U.S. at 17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 7. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 283-84 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 8. 465 U.S. at 10. 
 9. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 13 (1994). 
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Court) to dictate to states when they may make their courts available to liti-
gants in cases that do not implicate federal jurisdiction. 
Part V addresses an alternative argument for dynamic interpretation of the 
FAA: Justice Stevens’s suggestion that intervening legal history since 1925 sup-
ports the judicial reconstruction of the FAA culminating in Southland.  Part V 
argues that Southland’s interpretation of the FAA as preemptive substantive 
law is the result of two major federalism errors: a sequence of missteps and non 
sequiturs seeking to resolve an illusory “Erie10 problem,” combined with a false 
analogy between the FAA and the judicial nationalism of federal labor law. 
Part VI argues that Justice O’Connor was wrong and that Justice Scalia was 
right—that “proper application of stare decisis does not prevent correction of 
the mistake” of Southland.11  Whatever might be said for the interest in adhering 
to stare decisis in statutory interpretation cases, special considerations justify 
departure when a mistaken interpretation raises significant constitutional ques-
tions of federalism.  By authorizing the creation of a “body of federal substan-
tive [common] law,” Southland’s misinterpretation of the FAA is much like the 
constitutional error of Swift v. Tyson,12 whose interpretation of section 34 of the 
Judiciary Act of 178913 was famously overruled by Erie.14  Indeed, in an impor-
tant respect, Southland is a worse mistake than Swift: the federal common law 
created under the Swift regime did not apply in state court; that created under 
Southland does.  Moreover, it is a contradiction for the Court to maintain that 
Congress must act to correct the Court’s federalism mistake when, elsewhere, 
the Court has argued that federalism principles require it to correct the mis-
takes of Congress. 
Finally, Part VII offers three alternative interpretations of the FAA that 
could be adopted in overruling Southland. 
II 
SOUTHLAND AND THE FEDERALISM REVIVAL 
A. Southland’s Reinterpretation of the FAA 
In Southland Corp. v. Keating, several California franchisees of 7-Eleven 
convenience stores sued Southland, the corporate owner-franchisor of the 7-
Eleven chain, in state court.  The plaintiffs advanced various state-law theories, 
including claims under a state statute designed to protect franchisees from over-
reaching.15  Southland sought to compel arbitration of all claims pursuant to an 
 
 10. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (deciding how federal courts sitting in diversity 
are to determine whether state or federal legal standards govern). 
 11. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 12. 42 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 13. 1 Stat. 73 (1790). 
 14. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 15. California Franchise Investment Law, CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West 1977); see 
Southland, 465 U.S. at 21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining the purpose of the law). 
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arbitration clause in the standard-form franchise agreement, but the California 
Supreme Court construed the franchise law to preclude arbitration of the statu-
tory claim.16  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state rule 
against arbitrating statutory franchise disputes was preempted by section 2 of 
the FAA.  “In enacting § 2 of the federal Act,” the Court held, “Congress 
declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the 
states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the con-
tracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”17 
The proposition that the FAA preempted any state law that would limit the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements was brand new.  Chief Justice Burger’s 
majority opinion sought to justify this reinvention of the FAA in large part with 
a pair of policy rationales: a policy against forum shopping and a newly con-
ceived “national policy favoring arbitration.”18  Because preemption is a ques-
tion of congressional intent, the main focus of the majority’s opinion was inter-
preting the language and history of the FAA.  The statute itself is silent with 
regard to its effect on state law.  Straining to draw favorable inferences from a 
legislative history it determined to be “not without ambiguities,” and ignoring 
clear indications that the FAA was not intended to bind the states, the South-
land majority reasoned that Congress, by basing the FAA on its power “to 
enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause,” must have intended to 
make substantive law, binding on state as well as federal courts.19 
If original congressional intent is the touchstone of a statute’s preemptive 
effect, Southland was plainly wrong.  The historical record clearly shows that 
the FAA was intended to be a procedural statute for the federal courts, that it 
was not intended to preempt state law, and that it was designed to reverse the 
“ouster doctrine”20 but otherwise preserve all applicable state contract law.  
Ignoring all this, the Southland majority asserted it was “inexplicable” that 
Congress would have limited the FAA’s scope to contracts in interstate com-
merce and admiralty if it had intended only to make procedural law for the fed-
eral courts: “We therefore view the ‘involving commerce’ requirement in § 2, 
not as an inexplicable limitation on the power of the federal courts, but as a 
necessary qualification on a statute intended to apply in state and federal 
courts.”21  As will be seen, the “involving commerce” requirement was the very 
explicable result of a Senate amendment designed to narrow the FAA’s reach.22 
Nor was there anything unprecedented in either using the commerce power 
to enact a procedural rule or creating a procedural rule applicable to a limited 
 
 16. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 10 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1977)). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 10-14. 
 19. Id. at 11-12. 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 74-79. 
 21. 465 U.S. at 14-15. 
 22. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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subset of federal judicial business.23  As Justice Thomas would later put it, 
“Congress might well have thought that even if it could have called upon fed-
eral courts to enforce arbitration agreements in every single case that came 
before them, there was no federal interest in doing so unless interstate com-
merce or maritime transactions were involved.”24 
On the other hand, the majority’s interpretation of the FAA as preempting 
state law creates a difficulty that is much harder to explain than a provision lim-
iting a federal procedural rule to cases involving interstate contracts: Why 
would Congress create a “substantive” federal right without creating federal 
subject matter jurisdiction for its vindication?  The FAA provides for enforce-
ment of section 2 only in federal courts, either when a suit is already pending 
(section 3), or by petition to a federal district court that “save for such agree-
ment, would have jurisdiction” (section 4).25  These provisions have always been 
understood as conferring no independent federal question jurisdiction.26  When 
it suggested for the first time, in the year before Southland, that the FAA 
created a substantive federal right, the Court began transforming the FAA into 
“something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction.”27  The 
Southland majority noted this anomaly, but made no attempt to explain why 
Congress would have created it.28 
Three Justices dissented.  Justice O’Connor, joined by then-Justice 
Rehnquist, relying on some of the historical evidence detailed above, argued 
that the FAA was intended to establish purely procedural rules enforceable 
only in federal court and therefore could not be construed to bind state courts 
or to preempt state law.29  Justice Stevens, although agreeing that the FAA was 
originally intended to be procedural, felt that “intervening developments” com-
pelled the conclusion that the FAA preempts state law regulating arbitration 
agreements in general.  He argued, however, that the savings clause preserves 
“certain substantive state policies that would be undermined by enforcing cer-
tain categories of arbitration clauses.”30 
Since Southland, the principle of FAA preemption has become firmly estab-
lished.  The Supreme Court itself has reaffirmed or extended Southland in four 
 
 23. See 465 U.S. at 26 n.11 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing, among other things, FED. R. CIV. P. 
81(a), which provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inapplicable to certain admiralty, 
copyright, and bankruptcy proceedings). 
 24. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 292 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 25. The phrase “courts of the United States” in section 3 means the federal courts.  See infra note 
92 and accompanying text. 
 26. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983).  For 
early cases, see Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, Inc., 62 F.2d 1004, 1006 (2d Cir. 
1933); In re Woerner, 31 F.2d 283, 283 (2d Cir. 1929). 
 27. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 n.32. 
 28. Southland, 465 U.S. at 15 n.9. 
 29. Id. at 23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 30. Id. at 18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
SCHWARTZ_GLOBAL.FMT.DOC 10/14/2004  10:22 AM 
10 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 67:5 
cases.31  In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,32 for example, the Court held 
that the FAA preempted an Alabama statute making predispute arbitration 
agreements unenforceable.  Although preemption in Allied-Bruce followed 
from a straightforward application of Southland, the case is significant because 
a strong argument was made, with the endorsement of twenty state attorneys 
general as amici curiae,33 that Southland should be overruled.  In a concurring 
opinion in Allied-Bruce, Justice O’Connor reluctantly “acquiesce[d] in today’s 
judgment” on the strength of “considerations of stare decisis, which we have 
said have ‘special force in the area of statutory interpretation.’”34 Although 
Southland was wrong, it would rest with Congress to correct the mistake.35 
For Justice Scalia, dissenting in Allied-Bruce, “Southland clearly miscon-
strued the Federal Arbitration Act,” and “entails a permanent, unauthorized 
eviction of state-court power to adjudicate a potentially large class of 
disputes.”36  Justice Scalia argued further that Justice O’Connor’s scruple about 
stare decisis was misplaced.  Unlike a substantive rule of decision, he argued, an 
arbitration clause is merely a forum-selection clause that should not affect 
“[p]rimary behavior” or create substantial reliance interests on “the Southland 
guarantee” of preemption.  Therefore, he did “not believe that proper applica-
tion of stare decisis prevents correction of the mistake.” 37  Justice Scalia added 
that although he would no longer dissent from decisions resting on Southland, 
he would “join four other Justices in overruling it.”38  Finally, Justice Thomas, in 
a dissent joined by Justice Scalia, took up the argument that the FAA is a pro-
cedural statute.  With Justices Scalia and Thomas joining the original three 
Southland dissenters, five Justices on the present Court have at one time or 
another dissented from the Southland preemption principle. 
 
 31. See Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that FAA section 2 preempts a 
Montana statute imposing protective form requirements on arbitration agreements); Allied-Bruce, 513 
U.S. at 265 (holding that section 2 preempts an Alabama statute barring enforcement of predispute 
arbitration agreements); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (holding that section 2 preempts a Cali-
fornia statute barring enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements for wage-and-hour claims).  In 
Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), the Court brushed aside an opportunity to employ 
the federalism-based presumption against preemption, which would have allowed the Court to decline 
to extend Southland further.  See infra text accompanying notes 61-66.  In two other cases, the Court 
has stated that the FAA would preempt state laws that “would undermine the goals and policies of the 
FAA.”  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477-78 (1989); 
see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59 (1995) (holding that “in the 
absence of contractual intent to the contrary, [the] FAA would preempt” state decisional law preclud-
ing punitive damage awards by arbitrators). 
 32. 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
 33. Id. at 272. 
 34. Id. at 283-84 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 
164, 172-73 (1989)). 
 35. Id. at 284 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice Stevens joined the majority, probably because he 
believed the Alabama law to be a generalized, anti-arbitration statute of the type that he suggested 
would be preempted in his partial concurrence in Southland. 
 36. Id. at 284-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 37. Id. at 284. 
 38. Id. at 285. 
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B. Southland’s Tension with Federalism 
Southland is very much out of step with the Court’s federalism decisions of 
the past decade.  Its broad rule of preemption comes at great cost to state law-
making autonomy, the primary value of federalism. 
1. The Federalism Revival and State Lawmaking Autonomy 
Since 1991, the Supreme Court has, in the name of federalism, struck down 
provisions of several acts of Congress39 and overruled or curtailed several key 
precedents.40  The most ambitious normative justification given for the Court’s 
federalism revival is Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Gregory v. Ashcroft,41 which 
has been frequently echoed in whole or in part in subsequent federalism cases:42 
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous advan-
tages.  It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse 
needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in 
democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in govern-
ment; and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition 
for a mobile citizenry.43 
Picking up the themes of “experimentation” and “competition for a mobile citi-
zenry,” the concurrence by Justice Kennedy in United States v. Lopez relied 
heavily on Justice Brandeis’s famous dictum that the states can serve as “labora-
tories for experimentation” in social policy.44 A common thread runs through 
these various values of federalism.  All assume a substantial degree of state 
lawmaking autonomy; none would have much meaning if the states were merely 
administrative units of a single, national sovereign.  Decentralization, diversity, 
and experimentation all directly require that the states enact and implement 
their own policies.  Even the “republican” virtue of participation in government 
presupposes that there is a government worth the time and trouble.  A govern-
 
 39. E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the civil enforcement provi-
sion of the Violence Against Women Act); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down 
provisions of the Brady Act requiring state cooperation in federal gun control); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act); see also Fallon, supra note 2, at 
430 n.2 (citing “at least ten” such instances). 
 40. E.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding an Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) provision providing a private right of action against states an invalid abro-
gation of sovereign immunity), significantly limiting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (uphold-
ing Congress’s authority to extend the ADEA to states under the Commerce Clause); Seminole Tribe 
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (invalidating a provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
abrogating state sovereign immunity pursuant to Article I powers), overruling Pennsylvania v. Union 
Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding Congress can abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to Article I 
powers). 
 41. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 42. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (citing Gregory as setting forth the “first principles” of feder-
alism). 
 43. 501 U.S. at 458. 
 44. “[O]ne of the happy incidents of the federal system [is] that a single courageous State may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to 
the rest of the country.”  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting), quoted in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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mental sub-unit without lawmaking sovereignty would not likely generate as 
much interest in its politics as do states in our federal system. 
Preemption doctrine—the application of a federal statute to nullify state 
laws under the Supremacy Clause45—represents the most significant and fre-
quently applied limitation on substantive state autonomy in our constitutional 
scheme.46  As a practical matter, Lopez and United States v. Morrison have not 
significantly curtailed the federal commerce power, which still potentially 
reaches most subjects of legislation.47  But preemption doctrine holds that Con-
gress may nullify state law on any subject within federal legislative jurisdiction.  
“[T]he true test of federalist principle may lie,” therefore, “not in the occasional 
effort to trim Congress’[s] commerce power at its edges, or to protect a State’s 
treasury from a private damages action, but rather in those many statutory cases 
where courts interpret the mass of technical detail that is the ordinary diet of 
the law”—namely, preemption cases.48 
Recognizing this, the Supreme Court has held that federalism concerns sup-
port a “presumption against preemption” according to which the Court will not 
read ambiguous statutes to displace state laws in areas of traditional state regu-
lation.49  In Gregory, the Court took this principle a step farther: “If Congress 
intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the 
Federal Government,’ it must make its intention ‘unmistakably clear in the lan-
guage of the statute.’”50  In essence, Gregory makes federalism values an impor-
tant canon of statutory interpretation that should weigh strongly against South-
land’s policy-based interpretation of the FAA as preempting state law. Not 
surprisingly, contracts are an area of traditional state regulation that federal 
courts should be “reluctant to federalize.”51 
 
 45. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 46. See, e.g., Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768 
(1994) (commenting that preemption “is almost certainly the most frequently used doctrine of constitu-
tional law in practice”); David S. Schwartz, Failing the “True Test” of Federalism: Preemption, the 
Supremacy Clause and the Federalism Revival (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 47. See generally Ronald D. Rotunda, The Implications of the New Commerce Clause Jurispru-
dence: An Evolutionary or Revolutionary Court?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 795 (2003). 
 48. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160-61 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 49. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring) (“‘[W]here . . . the field which Congress is said to have preempted includes areas that have 
been traditionally occupied by the States,’ congressional intent to supersede state laws must be ‘clear 
and manifest.’”) (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990)); Id. at 292 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“To the extent that federal statutes are ambiguous, we do not read them to displace state 
law.”); accord Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (“The exercise of state authority in a field traditionally occupied by state law will not be 
deemed pre-empted by a federal statute unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”). 
 50. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 
U.S. 58, 65 (1989), in turn quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)). 
 51. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 183 (1989) (quoting Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 
430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977)). 
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2. The Impact of FAA Preemption on State Autonomy 
The preemptive effect given to the FAA as a result of Southland provides a 
prime example of the intrusion on state sovereignty resulting from preemption.  
It has done considerable violence to the notion of the states as “laboratories for 
experimentation” by shutting down state experiments in the regulation of arbi-
tration agreements and inhibiting state case law development in this field. 
Arbitration agreements are widely regarded as a form of self-help deregula-
tion by corporations subject to various consumer- and employee-protection 
laws.52  Because of this, a number of states have enacted laws attempting to curb 
potential abuses of arbitration agreements.  These almost invariably have been 
held preempted; the Supreme Court alone has voided four such laws.53 
The state laws that have been held preempted, or that might be subject to 
preemption, come in a variety of shapes and sizes.  Alabama has the broadest 
statute, providing simply that a written predispute arbitration agreement is 
invalid.54  Most states have enacted arbitration statutes providing for specific 
enforcement of arbitration agreements, adopting language similar to the FAA,55 
but several of these statutes carve out exceptions to the general rule of enforce-
ment.56  While the Supreme Court has held that Congress may exempt certain 
kinds of claims from arbitration by an express provision or by implication,57 
under Southland, states are denied that authority.58  Nor can states condition 
enforcement of arbitration agreements on adherence to special formal require-
ments, such as printed notice—a common form of consumer-protection 
 
 52. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Con-
sumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 62-66. 
 53. See supra note 31. 
 54. ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1993), held preempted by Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 
U.S. 265 (1995). 
 55. Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have arbitration-enforcement statutes creating 
mechanisms similar to the FAA.  See 5 IAN R. MACNEIL, ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: 
AGREEMENTS, AWARDS & REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 41-44 app. I (5th 
ed. 1994). 
 56. Iowa and Missouri provide that arbitration agreements are unenforceable if they are found in 
“contracts of adhesion.” IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A.1(2)(a) (West 1999), held preempted in Heaberling 
Farms Inc. v. IGF Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 816, 822-23 (Iowa 2002); MO. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (2001), held 
preempted in Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. West, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (W.D. Mo. 2000).  Arkansas, 
Iowa, Kansas, and South Carolina have provisions of their arbitration statutes exempting tort claims 
from coverage.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-201(b) (Michie 2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A.1(2)(c); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401(c)(3) (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(b)(2) (Law Co-op 2002), held pre-
empted in Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 542 S.E.2d 360, 365 (S.C. 2001). 
 57. Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987). 
 58. Thus, a provision in California’s labor code preserving the administrative and judicial forum 
and barring enforcement of arbitration agreements for claims for unpaid wages was held preempted by 
the Court in Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (holding preempted CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 
1971)). 
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regulation.59  The most widespread form of state law subject to Southland pre-
emption is the regulation of predispute arbitration agreements in employment 
contracts.  At least eleven states would decline to enforce arbitration agree-
ments in employment disputes.60 
The prevalence of state laws exempting employment disputes from arbitra-
tion enforcement gave particular significance to the Supreme Court’s 2001 deci-
sion in Circuit City Stores v. Adams.61  In Circuit City, the Court was required to 
determine the scope of an exclusion in section 1 of the FAA that exempts from 
FAA coverage all “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or 
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”62  The 
Court concluded that the canon of statutory construction known as ejusdem 
generis “compelled” it to construe narrowly section 1’s phrase “any other class 
of workers” to embrace types of workers “similar in nature” to railroad employ-
ees and seamen, thus exempting only transportation workers from FAA cover-
age.63 
In light of the federalism revival, the Circuit City decision is surprising.  
There can be no doubt that the section 1 exclusion is ambiguous.  The distortion 
worked on the FAA by the subsequent expansion of the Commerce Clause, the 
unusual “involving commerce” and “evidencing a transaction” language in 
section 2’s coverage provision, and the sharp disagreement among courts and 
 
 59. See Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996) (holding preempted MONT. 
CODE ANN. §27-5-114(4) (1995), which required that printed notice of an arbitration clause appear on 
the first page of a form contract, in prominent type). 
 60. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1517 (2001) (providing that the state’s arbitration statute “shall 
have no application to arbitration agreements between employers and employees”), held preempted in 
Alphagraphics Franchising, Inc. v. Whaler Graphics, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 708, 711 (D. Ariz. 1993); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 16-108-201(b) (Michie 2001) (exempting “employer-employee disputes”); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 679A.1(2)(b) (West 2002) (exempting “a contract between employers and employees”); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 5-401(c)(1) (2002) (exempting “contracts between employers and employees”); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 336.700(2) (Michie 2002) (“[N]o employer shall require as a condition or precondition of 
employment that any employee or person seeking employment waive, arbitrate, or otherwise diminish 
any existing or future claim.”); id. at § 417.050(2) (providing that “arbitration agreements between 
employers and employees” will not be enforced); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. 3-206(b) 
(exempting “an arbitration agreement between employers and employees”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-
10(b)(4) (Law Co-op 2002) (precluding arbitration of “workmen’s compensation claims, unemployment 
compensation claims and collective bargaining disputes” and providing that an arbitration agreement 
“shall not be made a condition of employment”); WIS. STAT. § 788.01 (2002) (exempting contracts of 
employment), held preempted in Bungard v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 537 N.W.2d 433 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).  
In addition, Alabama’s prohibition on enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements, ALA. CODE § 
8-1-41(3) (1993), and Missouri’s on adhesion contracts, MO. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (2001), would also 
apply to employment cases.  California and Colorado bar enforcement of arbitration agreements for 
wage-and-hour claims.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 1979), held preempted in Perry v. Thomas, 482 
U.S. 483 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. 8-4-125 (1997), held preempted in Grohn v. Sisters of Charity 
Health Servs. Colo., 960 P.2d 722, 727-28 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998). 
 61. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 62. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
 63. 532 U.S. at 105 (noting that ejusdem generis requires that general words following specific ones 
in a statutory enumeration be construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects 
enumerated by the preceding specific words). 
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commentators over the exclusion’s meaning all support this conclusion.64  The 
Supreme Court implicitly agreed that the language is ambiguous, since there 
would have been no need to resort to canons of statutory interpretation had the 
language been clear.  Given the ambiguity, federalism principles dictated con-
struing the provision in a manner that would preempt less state law.65  Instead, 
the Court extended the scope of arbitration agreements to which the FAA 
would apply and subjected more state law to Southland preemption, simply 
brushing aside the federalism issue.66 
In general, preemption of state law stifles state “experimentation,” not only 
by nullifying laws on the books, but also by discouraging proposals to change 
the law.  Drafters of bills may forego desirable regulation of arbitration agree-
ments, and FAA preemption gives legislative opponents of such measures addi-
tional ammunition.  For example, the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws was considering addressing issues relating to adhesive 
arbitration agreements in its Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, but determined 
that “the preemptive effect of the Federal Arbitration Act . . . . dramatically 
limits meaningful choices for drafters addressing adhesion contracts.”67  In 
committee hearings on a California proposal to amend the state employment 
discrimination statute to prohibit the imposition of predispute arbitration 
agreements as a condition of employment, opponents argued that the bill “vio-
lates the Federal Arbitration Act.”68 
FAA preemption also tends to inhibit state decisional law.  The section 2 
savings clause has been construed to preserve general state contract-law 
defenses to arbitration agreements.69  Due largely to Southland’s preemption 
doctrine, however, the case law has developed into a complex mixture of fed-
eral and state law.70  Some state courts, made skittish by the federal preemption 
issue looming around them, have tended to apply federal law to resolve state-
 
 64. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 65. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.  Regulation of the employment relationship is 
another area traditionally occupied by state law.  See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’t Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 
U.S. 88, 96 (1992). 
 66. The Court’s assertion that Southland “is not directly implicated in this case,” Circuit City, 532 
U.S. at 122, is not a satisfactory answer.  The issue in Circuit City was whether to extend Southland’s 
preemption rule into an area of doubtful applicability.  Without questioning Southland, the Court could 
and should have limited its damage by applying the restraining federalism principle of Gregory. 
 67. Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws, Adhesion Arbitration Agreements and the 
RUAA, at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarba/arbr0500.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2003). 
 68. CAL. S. COMM. REP. NO. 1538, 2001-2002 Reg. Sess. (2002). 
 69. “State law may be applied” to invalidate or regulate an arbitration agreement, “if that law 
arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.” 
Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996) (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 
n.9 (1987)).  Indeed, a proper interpretation of the savings clause in section 2 is that all contract issues 
are to be resolved according to state law.  See infra Part III.B.4. 
 70. See Charles Davant IV, Note, Tripping on the Threshold: Federal Courts’ Failure to Observe 
Controlling State Law Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 51 DUKE L.J. 521, 539-41 (2001). 
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law contract questions such as unconscionability.71  Some courts mistakenly 
believe that the FAA preempts even a general contract doctrine such as uncon-
scionability when the latter is applied to an arbitration agreement.72  Finally, 
some courts in FAA cases have simply ignored applicable state-law principles 
and applied a general federal contract law reminiscent of the era of Swift v. 
Tyson.73  Such a mishmash of federal and state law is troubling if one holds 
genuine federalism concerns because it has a strong tendency to inhibit devel-
opment of state decisional law and to displace more state law than is warranted. 
III 
PREEMPTION AND THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF THE FAA 
Preemption is a question of congressional intent.74  In deciding whether the 
FAA created substantive law that preempts state limitations on arbitration 
agreements, Southland should have been guided by the original intent of the 
FAA.  Instead, Southland flouted the FAA’s historical record, which showed as 
clearly as possible, given the lack of explicit mention of preemption, that Con-
gress intended the FAA to be a procedural statute that neither applies in state 
court nor preempts state law. 
A. The FAA’s Legal Context 
The proximate historical concern underlying the passage of the FAA has 
been well explained.75  Arbitration agreements were deemed substantively valid 
insofar as an aggrieved party could in theory bring an action for damages for 
breach of an arbitration agreement.  The problem lay in their enforcement.  At 
common law, an arbitration agreement could not be the basis for a “plea in 
bar”—essentially, a defense to a contract action requiring dismissal.  Nor would 
courts of equity specifically enforce arbitration agreements or stay actions 
pending arbitration.  Finally, courts deemed arbitration agreements to be revo-
cable at the will of either party at any time before an arbitration award was 
enforced.76  These doctrines, which came to be known as “the old judicial hos-
 
 71. See, e.g., GLF Constr. Corp. v. Recchi-GLF, 821 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (applying 
federal law to a contractual waiver defense to an arbitration agreement); Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. 
Corp., 542 S.E.2d 360, 364-65 (S.C. 2001) (buttressing its unconscionability holding with federal 
authority). 
 72. See, e.g., Bradley v. Harris Research, 275 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 2001) (mistakenly concluding 
that the FAA preempted a state statute regulating contractual venue clauses). 
 73. 42 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).  In the notorious case of Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 
1997), for example, the court upheld against a consumer an arbitration agreement contained in shrink-
wrap packaging on the box in which a mail-order computer was delivered.  The court concluded the 
shrinkwrap form was a contract, without citing any state law of contract formation. 
 74. E.g., Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) (stating that the “purpose of Con-
gress is the ultimate touchstone” of the preemption doctrine). 
 75. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 969-94 (1999); Schwartz, supra note 52, at 70-81. 
 76. See, e.g., Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1924); Kulukundis Shipping 
Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 981-84 (2d Cir. 1942); United States Asphalt Refining 
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tility to arbitration,”77 were based primarily on the theory that an arbitration 
agreement was an “ouster of jurisdiction” of the court and therefore void or 
voidable as against public policy.78 
The American Bar Association (ABA) and various business associations 
began promoting the passage of statutes to overrule this “ouster doctrine.”79 
Significantly, arbitration enforcement statutes, such as the New York Arbitra-
tion Act, on which the FAA was modeled,80 were deemed nonsubstantive law.  
There appears to have been an ambiguity in the contemporary legal under-
standing about whether arbitration agreements presented a question of proce-
dure or a question of remedy.81  But the ambiguity really did not matter because 
both remedial and procedural matters were deemed to be lex fori—the law of 
the court—rather than lex loci—the substantive law of the jurisdiction.  For 
both remedies and procedures, the prevailing principle was a federal rule for 
federal courts, and a state rule for state courts.82  There was a consensus that 
arbitration was not a matter of substantive law.83 
Substantive law, in contrast to procedure and remedy, was lex loci, the law 
of the jurisdiction, but there was one significant wrinkle.  Section 34 of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789, known as the Rules of Decision Act, provides that the “laws 
 
Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); JULIUS H. COHEN, COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 226-41 (1918); IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: 
REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 20-21 (1992); Schwartz, supra note 52, 
at 73-75; Stone, supra note 75, at 973-76. 
 77. Kulukundis Shipping, 126 F.2d at 985.  While courts may have been hostile to enforcing arbitra-
tion agreements before the FAA, they were more receptive to enforcing arbitration awards.  See 
MACNEIL, supra note 76, at 19. 
 78. Schwartz, supra note 52, at 74; Stone, supra note 75, at 976. 
 79. See Schwartz, supra note 52, at 75-81; Stone, supra note 75, at 979-91. 
 80. 1920 N.Y. Laws 275 § 2 (codified as New York Civil Practice Act § 1448).  The bill that became 
the FAA “follows the lines of the New York arbitration law enacted in 1920.”  S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 
(1924). 
 81. Compare Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 122-23 (1924) (Brandeis, J.) (“The [New York] Arbitra-
tion Law deals merely with the remedy in the state courts . . . .  It does not attempt either to modify the 
substantive maritime law or to deal with the remedy in courts of admiralty.”), with Berkovitz v. Arbib 
& Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 290 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, J.) (“Arbitration is a form of procedure 
whereby differences may be settled.  It is not a definition of the rights and wrongs out of which differ-
ences grow.”).  Both Red Cross Line and Berkovitz were construing the New York Arbitration Law of 
1920. 
 82. See S. Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202, 209 (1892) (“[W]henever Congress has legislated upon 
any matter of practice, and prescribed a definite rule for the government of its own courts, it is to that 
extent exclusive of the legislation of the state upon the same matter.”). 
 83. See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 
265, 276 (1926).  Cohen and Dayton wrote, 
[W]hether or not a contract exists is a question of the substantive law of the jurisdiction 
wherein the contract was made.  But whether or not an arbitration agreement is to be 
enforced is a question of the law of procedure and is determined by the law of the jurisdiction 
wherein the remedy is sought.  That the enforcement of arbitration contracts is within the law 
of procedure as distinguished from substantive law is well settled by the decisions of our 
courts. 
Id. 
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of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the 
United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of deci-
sion in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where 
they apply.”84  This statute seems to require application of state substantive law 
in diversity cases, but prior to the Erie decision in 1938, federal courts sitting in 
diversity in cases at common law had given themselves a kind of substantive 
lawmaking power under the regime of Swift v. Tyson.85  Formally, the Supreme 
Court recognized that there was no such thing as federal common law, but Swift 
held that the phrase “laws of the several States” means a state’s statutes, not its 
decisional law.  In the absence of a controlling state statute, the Swift doctrine 
held, federal courts could exercise “independent judgment” on any substantive 
question of “general law,” including commercial law, torts, and even property 
matters.86  Significantly, the prevailing judicial view under Swift held that the 
federal courts’ power to declare legal principles of general law was not con-
strained by the limits on the legislative powers of Congress.  Under the crabbed 
view of the Commerce Clause in this era, the Supreme Court would likely have 
found Congress to be without constitutional authority to legislate on most of 
the matters on which federal courts created general common law.87 
B. The FAA and its Legislative History 
The FAA was introduced in 1922 and enacted in 1925.88  It was originally 
intended as a procedural rule for the federal courts and was amended prior to 
passage to narrow its scope to exclude contracts not involving maritime or inter-
state commerce transactions.  The idea that the FAA would apply in state 
courts or preempt state law was beyond the contemplation of Congress; it 
simply did not arise in the legislative history of the Act.89 
 
 84. Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 § 34, 1 Stat. 73 (1790) (currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 
(2000)). 
 85. 42 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 86. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 51-56 (2001). 
The theory was that courts, federal or state, were all similarly engaged in the process of attempting to 
discover the true, preexisting common law principle—the “brooding omnipresence” criticized by 
Holmes.  See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J.) (“The common law is not a 
brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can 
be identified.”); PURCELL, supra, at 51, 68-69, 78. 
 87. PURCELL, supra note 86, at 54-58. 
 88. Identical federal arbitration bills were introduced simultaneously in the House and Senate 
during the Sixty-Seventh Congress.  S. 4214, 67th Cong. (1922); H.R. 13522, 67th Cong. (1922); 65 
CONG. REC. 732, 797 (1922).  Hearings were held, but neither bill came to a vote in committee.  See 
Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Law 
and Its Application, 11 ABA JOURNAL 153, 155 (1925) [hereinafter ABA, Arbitration Law].  The bills 
were reintroduced in the Sixty-Eighth Congress in 1923 as S. 1005 and H.R. 646, and eventually enacted 
and signed into law just before the end of the Sixty-Eighth Congress, on February 14, 1925.  See S. 1005, 
68th Cong. (1925); H.R. 646, 68th Cong. (1925); 66 CONG. REC. 2761, 3003, 3276, 3748 (1925). 
 89. Professor Ian Macneil has written the leading scholarly account of the FAA’s legislative history 
and critique of Southland’s version of that history. MACNEIL, supra note 76, at 92-121, 138-47.  
Although comprehensive, Macneil’s account does not take notice of the Walsh Amendment or the 
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1. The FAA as a Procedural Statute for Federal Courts 
It is plain that the federal arbitration bill was intended to provide procedural 
law for the federal courts.  The House Report stated: 
Whether an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of proce-
dure to be determined by the law court [sic]90 in which the proceeding is brought and 
not one of substantive law to be determined by the law of the forum in which the con-
tract is made.  Before such contracts could be enforced in the Federal courts, there-
fore, this law is essential.  The bill declares that such agreements shall be recognized 
by the courts of the United States.91 
The bill provided recognition and enforcement in “the courts of the United 
States.”  This phrase was synonymous with federal courts; state courts were not 
“courts of the United States,” but rather “courts of the several states.”92  The 
House Report also restates the uncontroversial proposition that arbitration is 
forum law (lex fori)—albeit procedure, rather than remedy—and not substan-
tive law.  Why was this bill “essential” to make arbitration agreements enforce-
able in federal court?  That assertion follows logically from the lex fori point: If 
arbitration clause enforcement were a matter of substantive law—lex loci—then 
a state arbitration statute should have been binding on federal courts sitting in 
diversity, even under Swift.93  Members of Congress were made well aware by 
the ABA proponents of the bill that parallel arbitration bills were being urged 
 
other points discussed below.  See infra Parts III.B.2-B.3.  For a thought-provoking argument conclud-
ing that Southland reached a correct conclusion about the FAA’s legislative history, see Christopher R. 
Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2002).  In essence, Drahozal argues, in response to Macneil, that the 
legislative history is ambiguous about Congress’s intent to preempt state law, but that the private lob-
byists from the ABA who drafted the original bill and testified in its favor in committee hearings be-
lieved the FAA would apply in state court.  While Drahozal makes some persuasive points, his argu-
ment does not engage with some of the plainest indications in the legislative history that Congress 
intended to make the FAA a procedural rule for the federal courts.  See infra text accompanying notes 
90-111.  Moreover, the statements of lobbyist Julius Cohen on which Drahozal relies were in fact very 
ambiguous on whether the FAA would preempt state law.  See infra note 111.  Drahozal’s premise that 
statements by lobbyists may legitimately be “imput[ed] . . . to Congress” for purposes of determining 
legislative intent also seems dubious.  See Drahozal, supra, at 107 n.38.  Finally, even assuming that lob-
byist intent can ever serve as a proxy for legislative intent, that contention is irrelevant here, since the 
ABA’s version of the arbitration bill was amended by Congress to substantially narrow the Act’s cov-
erage.  See infra text accompanying notes 100-09. 
 90. This is likely the third typographical error in the first two paragraphs of the Report and was 
probably intended to read “law of the court,” which would then parallel the contrasting phrase “law of 
the forum” that follows.  Either way, the meaning is plain. 
 91. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924).  Furthermore, after summarizing the ouster rule, the Report 
states that “[t]he bill declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and pro-
vides a procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement.”  Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
 92. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 29 & n.18 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Rules 
of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000) (“[T]he laws of the several states . . . shall be regarded as rules 
of decision . . . in the courts of the United States.”); Federal Employers’ Liability Act § 1, 36 Stat. 291 
(1910) (“[J]urisdiction of the courts of the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with 
that of the courts of the several states.”). 
 93. Again, the Swift doctrine allowed federal courts sitting in diversity to exercise independent 
judgment and diverge from state decisional law, but federal courts technically considered themselves 
bound to follow state statutes.  See supra text accompanying notes 84-87. 
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on state legislatures and had been adopted in a number of states.94  The federal 
bill was needed because these state statutes were lex fori and would therefore 
not be applied by federal courts.95 
The nonsubstantive nature of the arbitration bill was reiterated in a floor 
statement by the sponsor of the House bill: 
It does not involve any new principle of law except to provide a simple method by 
which the parties may be brought before the court in order to give enforcement to that 
which they have already agreed to. . . . It creates no new legislation, grants no new 
rights, except a remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and in admi-
ralty contracts.96 
Courts and commentators interpreting the FAA in the decade following its 
enactment understood the statute as a matter of remedy or procedure applica-
ble in federal court rather than as substantive law.97  In Marine Transit Corp. v. 
Dreyfus,98 for example, a party to an arbitration agreement challenged FAA 
enforcement on the argument that Congress had no authority to create equita-
ble remedies—here, specific performance—in admiralty.  The Court could have 
easily brushed this argument aside on the ground that Congress has the power 
to make substantive admiralty law, had the Court believed the FAA was in fact 
substantive law.  Instead, the Court upheld the FAA as a permissible exercise of 
“[t]he general power of the Congress to provide remedies in matters falling 
within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, and to regulate their pro-
cedure.”99 
 
 94. See, e.g., Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commer-
cial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
67th Cong. 2 (1923) (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman, Arbitration Comm., N.Y. Cham-
ber of Commerce) (“The commercial bodies of the country have been urging the adoption of this prin-
ciple of legislation throughout the country.”); S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (“The bill . . . follows the 
lines of the New York arbitration law enacted in 1920.”); see also Stone, supra note 75, at 985-87 
(detailing state adoptions of arbitration-enforcement statutes). 
 95. The House Report’s assertion understandably glosses over a complicating point.  Cases on the 
common law “side” of the federal docket were supposed to be litigated and tried, under the Conformity 
Act of 1872, according to procedures that “conform as near as may be” to the procedures of the courts 
of the state in which the federal court sat. Conformity Act of 1872 § 5, 17 Stat. 197; see Nudd v. Bur-
rows, 91 U.S. 426, 441-42 (1875).  However, a specific federal procedural statute could supersede the 
Conformity Act to control common law practice.  See S. Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202, 209 (1892).  
In any event, since the whole point of the FAA was to authorize specific performance of arbitration 
agreements, the remedy and procedure questions in federal court would be addressed to its equity or 
admiralty jurisdiction, and state procedures were given no effect in federal courts sitting in admiralty or 
equity.  See, e.g., Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124 (1924) (admiralty); JOHN C. ROSE, 
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 482-83 (1926) (equity). 
 96. 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (statement of Rep. Graham).  Representative Graham chaired the 
House Judiciary Committee, which reported on the bill.  See H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924). 
 97. See MACNEIL, supra note 76, at 122-33. 
 98. 284 U.S. 263 (1932). 
 99. Id. at 278 (emphasis added); accord The Gerald A. Fagan, 49 F.2d 215, 216 (2d Cir. 1931) (“The 
Arbitration Act is a procedural statute and within the competency of Congress . . . .  [It] is directed 
solely to a remedy”); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Am. Mineral Spirits Co., 22 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) 
(holding that the FAA is procedural and therefore applies in diversity cases).  For contemporary com-
mentary construing the FAA as procedural, see Cohen & Dayton, supra note 83, at 275-76; 6 S. 
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2. FAA Coverage: “Maritime Transactions” and “Contracts Involving 
Commerce” 
What of the argument, upon which Southland heavily relies, that Congress 
would not have imposed the “maritime” and “involving commerce” require-
ments in section 2 of the FAA unless it intended to create substantive law 
binding on the states?  The answer is that the federal arbitration bill was 
initially intended to govern the procedure for a broad range of commercial con-
tracts, including intrastate commercial contracts, but was amended to shrink the 
statute’s coverage.  As originally introduced in Congress, the bill that became 
the FAA provided: 
Sec. 2.  That a written provision in any contract or maritime transaction or transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between 
the parties out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or 
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing con-
troversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevo-
cable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.100 
Significantly, Congress in this period lacked authority to enact substantive 
regulations of “any contract” outside of admiralty or interstate commerce, 
although federal courts could “discover” principles of general common law 
governing such contracts.101  The FAA could apply to “any contract” only if the 
law were procedural. 
In May 1924, five months after the House Report was written, the Senate 
amended its version of the bill, which had been identical to the House version, 
by deleting the phrase “contract or” and inserting the phrase “contract evi-
dencing a” before “transaction involving commerce.”102  The amendments were 
made at the behest of Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana, a member of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee.103  A progressive politician and former plaintiffs’ 
lawyer, Walsh consistently supported legislation to curtail federal diversity 
jurisdiction and strip federal courts of jurisdiction to enter injunctions against 
labor unions and state utility rate boards.104  He opposed the expansion of fed-
 
WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, LAW OF CONTRACTS 5368 (rev. ed. 1938) (“Inasmuch as arbitration acts 
are deemed procedural, the [FAA] applies only to the federal courts.”). 
 100. H.R. 646, 65 CONG. REC. 11,081 (1924) (emphasis added). 
 101. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
 102. S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 1 (1924) (amending S. 1005).  The House bill, H.R. 646, was substituted 
for the Senate bill and amended identically.  See 66 CONG. REC. S 2759-61 (Jan. 31, 1925).  Ultimately, 
H.R. 646, as amended by the Senate, was enacted into law.  H.R. 646, 68th Cong. (1925) (enacted); see 
66 CONG. REC. 3276, 3748 (1925). 
 103. 66 CONG. REC. S2761 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1925). 
 104. PURCELL, supra note 86, at 31-32, 78.  Abolition of diversity jurisdiction became a major pro-
gressive cause in this era because of the perceived pro-corporate bias of the federal courts.  The federal 
common law developed under the Swift regime was largely favorable to corporate defendants, who 
were usually able to remove tort cases, insurance coverage disputes, and the like to federal court based 
on diversity jurisdiction.  Federal courts aggressively used their equity powers to enjoin strikes and 
union activity, as well as to protect utility companies from rate regulation.  And, of course, federal 
courts were active during this, the Lochner era, in striking down progressive economic and social legis-
lation, at both the state and federal levels, on Commerce Clause and substantive due process grounds.  
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eral law at the expense of state law, even to the extent of opposing the Rules 
Enabling Act, which terminated the applicability of state procedural law in fed-
eral court cases at law.105  In committee hearings on the FAA, Walsh had 
expressed concern that the bill might be applied in adhesive employment or 
insurance contracts.106  Significantly, controlling Supreme Court precedent at the 
time held that neither employment nor insurance contracts were contracts 
involving interstate commerce.107  Thus, by limiting the FAA to contracts involv-
ing admiralty and interstate commerce, Walsh’s amendment would effectively 
exclude employment contracts and most insurance contracts from the FAA’s 
coverage.108  It is simply not plausible that an amendment proposed by Walsh 
would have been intended to expand the reach of the FAA and to preempt 
state law.  Deleting the phrase “contracts or” only makes sense as a restriction 
on the scope of federal court cases that would be covered by the FAA.  
Specifically, the FAA as amended would be inapplicable to diversity cases not 
involving interstate or admiralty contracts.109 
 
These activities produced a political backlash against the federal courts, in which, among other things, 
numerous bills were introduced in Congress to redress perceived abuses by the federal judiciary.  These 
congressional attempts at redress included bills to abolish or limit diversity jurisdiction and to deprive 
courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in rate cases and labor cases, as well as bills seeking to over-
rule Supreme Court decisions.  Id. at 77-91. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
67th Cong. 6 (1923) (remarks of Sen. Walsh).  The Senate hearings were on S. 4214, which was identical 
to the House and Senate arbitration bills introduced in the next Congress and enacted as the FAA.  See 
supra notes 88, 102. 
 107. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that intrastate employment is not 
“commerce” within Congress’s regulatory power); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) (hold-
ing that insurance contracts were not interstate commerce); see also PURCELL, supra note 86, at 55. 
 108. Marine insurance contracts may still have been covered by the FAA as amended, but, as con-
tracts between big business interests, they would not have been a particular concern to progressives like 
Walsh.  Employment contracts in admiralty had already been excluded by the addition of the famous 
section 1 exclusion for “contracts of employment of seamen,” in January 1923.  See Letter from Herbert 
Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, to Senator Thomas Sterling (Jan. 23, 1923), reprinted in Hearing on S. 
4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 14 (1923). 
 109. The Walsh Amendment explains another apparent ambiguity seized upon by the Southland 
majority.  The opening, typographical-error-laden sentence of the House Report states: “The purpose 
of this bill is to make valid and enforcible [sic] agreements for arbitration contained in contracts 
involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or [sic] admiralty, or which may be the subject 
of litigation in the federal courts.”  H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924).  The Southland opinion makes 
much of the third “or,” reading it to imply that “Congress had in mind something more than making 
arbitration agreements enforceable only in the federal courts.”  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 
12-13 (1984).  But that reading is strained and plainly contradicts the clear statements that follow in the 
Report to the effect that the FAA is procedural law for the federal courts. 
Macneil argues that the third “or” is a typographical error that should be deleted.  See MACNEIL, 
supra note 76, at 118.  Even if it were not, there is a more likely interpretation than the Southland 
Court’s, and one that is internally consistent with the rest of the House Report.  The original version of 
the bill, quoted above, which was the subject of this Report, applied to “any contract or maritime trans-
action or transaction involving commerce . . . .”  H.R. 646, 68th Cong. (1925) (emphasis added); see 
supra note 100 and accompanying text.  These three categories match the categories in the opening sen-
tence of the House Report and refer to three categories of contract cases that might appear in federal 
court: (1) interstate contracts, (2) admiralty contracts, and (3) all other contracts that find their way into 
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What of the House Report’s statement that the FAA “is founded also upon 
the Federal control over interstate commerce and over admiralty”?110  The 
Southland Court would read this statement as contradicting the immediately 
preceding assertion that the FAA is procedural law applicable in federal court.  
Congress’s control over judicial procedure was primarily seen as based on its 
power to create lower federal courts under Article III, as amplified by the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause.111  But there was then, and is today, nothing anoma-
lous about Congress enacting a procedural or remedial statute, as opposed to 
substantive law, pursuant to its admiralty or commerce power.112  The word 
“also” in the House Report implies that interstate commerce and admiralty 
were being given as alternative grounds to enact a procedural rule for arbitra-
tion agreements. 
3. The Absence of Preemptive Intent 
Preemption doctrine in 1925 cut more deeply, yet more narrowly, than 
today.  On one hand, the prevailing doctrine took the heavy-handed view that 
all preemption under the Commerce Clause was what would now be called 
“field” preemption: If Congress enacted a commerce regulation, then, unless it 
expressly saved state law, it was deemed to have occupied the field, and no state 
regulation on the same subject would be permitted.113  But the scope of federal 
preemption was limited by the narrow confines of the commerce power.  In con-
trast, while the modern commerce power has greatly expanded, preemption 
doctrine has become comparatively more flexible toward the states.114  If Con-
 
federal court under diversity or pendent jurisdiction.  The FAA was originally drafted, before the 
Walsh Amendment, as a blanket—procedural—rule to apply to all contracts that would come before 
the federal courts.  See supra text accompanying note 100. 
 110. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924); see Southland, 465 U.S. at 12-13 (quoting House Report). 
 111. Julius Cohen denied that “the proposed law depends entirely for its validity upon the exercise 
of the interstate-commerce and admiralty powers,” and argued instead that “it rests upon the constitu-
tional provision by which Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior Federal courts”—
Article III and the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Cohen & Dayton, supra note 83, at 275. 
 112. See, e.g., Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 278 (1932) (“The general power of the 
Congress to provide remedies in matters falling within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, 
and to regulate their procedure is undisputed.”).  As the Second Circuit put it: 
The Arbitration Act is a procedural statute and within the competency of Congress.  Congress 
has the power “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execu-
tion the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Govern-
ment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”  Article 1, § 8, clause 18. 
This includes the power to establish courts, power over interstate and foreign commerce (article 
1, § 8, clause 3), and jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime matters (article 3, § 2, clause 1). 
The Arbitration Act is directed solely to a remedy. 
The Gerald A. Fagan, 49 F.2d 215, 216 (2d Cir. 1931) (emphasis added); see also infra Part V.A.2. 
 113. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917) (holding that the Federal Employers’ 
Liability Act preempted state personal injury law for railroad workers); Gardbaum, supra note 46, at 
795-805. 
 114. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“[W]e start with the 
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act 
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”); Gardbaum, supra note 46, at 805-07. 
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gress had indeed intended the FAA to be substantive law binding on the states, 
there would have been no question, in 1925, of state law applying to arbitration 
clauses in interstate contracts. 
In the year before the FAA’s passage, the principle that enforcement of 
arbitration agreements was not preemptive substantive law was definitively set-
tled in the admiralty context by Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.115  State 
courts had (and have) concurrent jurisdiction over admiralty cases due to a 
savings clause in the jurisdictional statute.116  As the savings clause was con-
strued, in light of the constitutional allocation of admiralty jurisdiction to the 
federal judicial power, state courts were bound to follow federal substantive law 
in admiralty cases but could apply their own law of procedure and remedy.117  In 
Red Cross Line, an admiralty dispute litigated in New York state court, the 
question was whether it was constitutionally permissible for the state court to 
apply the New York Arbitration Law.  The Court concluded that the law “deals 
merely with the remedy in the state courts” and “does not attempt either to 
modify the substantive maritime law or to deal with the remedy in courts of 
admiralty.”118  If the enactment of the FAA the following year was intended as 
substantive law, its application to maritime contracts would have bound state 
courts in admiralty cases and preempted state law, and it would have effectively 
overruled Red Cross Line.  Yet it apparently never occurred to any court apply-
ing the FAA that state arbitration laws might be preempted, in admiralty cases 
or otherwise.119 
Nor, apparently, did preemption occur to Congress.  Nothing in the legisla-
tive history suggests that states would be bound to apply section 2, or any sec-
tion, of the FAA.  On the contrary, the Senate Report asserts that the federal 
arbitration bill “follows the lines of the New York Arbitration Law enacted in 
1920 . . . and sustained by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
 
 115. 264 U.S. 109 (1924). 
 116. Section 24(3) of the Judicial Code granted federal district courts jurisdiction over “all causes of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy.”  
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000) (originally enacted as Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, § 1, 42 Stat. 634, 28 U.S.C. § 
41(3) (1926)); see Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 221 nn.1-2 (1924).  This feature of 
the admiralty savings clause is substantially the same today, preserving concurrent state court jurisdic-
tion.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1); Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 445 (2001) (“[T]he 
saving to suitors clause preserves remedies and the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts over some 
admiralty and maritime claims.”). 
 117. Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 123-25; see W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. at 221 nn.1-2 (holding 
that a state workmen’s compensation law was substantive and therefore unconstitutional as applied to 
admiralty cases). 
 118. 264 U.S. at 124. 
 119. In the decade after the FAA’s enactment, FAA preemption of state arbitration acts in federal 
cases involving interstate or maritime contracts was simply not discussed.  Thus, for example, in Shan-
feroke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp., 293 U.S. 449 (1935), the Court applied section 
3 of the FAA to stay a federal diversity suit to allow the parties to a contract for the interstate sale of 
coal to arbitrate their dispute under the New York arbitration statute.  There was no hint that the New 
York act might be preempted by the FAA. 
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States in the matter of the Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.”120  Conspicu-
ously, the Senate Report does not say that the New York law would be pre-
empted, that Red Cross Line would become a nullity, or that the Senate dis-
agreed with the Court’s conclusion that arbitration is a matter of remedy and 
not substantive law—let alone that Congress might be overruling Red Cross 
Line. 
An illuminating comparison can be drawn between the FAA and two stat-
utes of that era that did create substantive regulation intended to preempt state 
law.  In the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA),121 governing the tort 
liability of interstate railroads to their injured employees, Congress abrogated 
the “fellow-servant” rule and replaced the harsh rule of contributory negligence 
as a complete bar to a plaintiff’s recovery with a comparative negligence stan-
dard.122  Congress made plain that FELA was meant to apply in state courts and 
to supersede state law by providing that “any contract, rule, regulation or 
device whatsoever” that was inconsistent with the new statute was void,123 and 
that state courts would have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts.124  
The Bill of Lading Act of 1916 imposed numerous notice and fairness require-
ments on shippers, regulated the content of bills of lading, and imposed liability 
for violations.125  This was substantive law for interstate contracts, and Congress 
indicated that it was fully aware of the implications.  In a section addressing 
“the constitutionality of the pending bill,” the Senate Report discussed at length 
the Supreme Court precedents recognizing complete preemption—in the lan-
guage of the day, “exclusive” regulation—when Congress had substantively 
regulated interstate commerce.126  “[T]hese cases,” the Report concluded, “show 
conclusively that if Congress passes this bill, it will supersede any and all state 
legislation upon the subject.”127  The absence of any similar indications that the 
 
 120. S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924). 
 121. Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, c. 149, §§ 1-8, 35 Stat. 65 (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 
(2000)). 
 122. The “fellow-servant” doctrine shielded employers from liability when the injured party was 
harmed by the actions of a co-worker.  See Joseph Slater, The Rise of Master-Servant and the Fall of 
Master Narrative: A Review of Labor Law in America, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 141, 152 (1994) 
(book review). 
 123. FELA § 5 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 55).  This provision was construed as binding state courts and 
preempting state law.  See Vandalia R.R. Co. v. Sanders, 121 N.E. 275 (Ind. 1918); Hogarty v. Phila. & 
Reading Ry. Co., 91 A. 854 (Pa. 1914). 
 124. Act of Apr. 5, 1910, c. 143 § 1, 36 Stat. 291 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 56) (amending FELA § 6). 
 125. Bill of Lading Act of 1916, c. 415, 39 Stat. 538.  A bill of lading is defined as “a bill in which it is 
stated that the goods are consigned or destined to a specified person.”  49 U.S.C. § 82 (2000). 
 126. S. REP. NO. 64-149, at 5-7 (1916).  An example providing such exclusive regulation was FELA. 
 127. Id. at 7; see also id. at 8 (asserting, in a series of rhetorical questions, that “the power of Con-
gress is plenary after it has once assumed to legislate upon a given subject” and that “if Congress 
decides to regulate a bill of lading from the time it is issued until it is spent[,] it supersedes the authority 
of the State to control such bill in its transfer from one citizen of a State to another citizen within that 
State”). 
Julius H. Cohen and the ABA, as the nation’s leading arbitration boosters, see Stone, supra note 75, 
at 979, may well have liked the FAA to apply as broadly as possible, including in state court, and there-
fore floated a hopeful trial balloon suggesting “probable” congressional power to preempt in this field. 
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FAA was intended to bind state courts—either in the statute’s text or its his-
tory—is telling. 
4. The Section 2 Savings Clause 
Out of its historical context, the phrasing of section 2—that arbitration 
agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable”—takes on an almost 
biblical gravity, as though an arbitration agreement were as unbreakable as 
God’s covenant with Abraham.  Since the 1980s, the federal courts have at 
times seemed to treat arbitration agreements in this way.  That, of course, mis-
construes the statute’s intended meaning. 
Calling arbitration agreements “valid” simply restated existing judge-made 
law.  As the Senate Report recognized, arbitration agreements were valid at law 
to the extent that an action in damages would lie for breach.128  The purpose of 
the FAA was to make these valid agreements enforceable, through a specific 
enforcement remedy combined with an order to stay proceedings in court. 
Again, whether called remedy or procedure, the concept captured in the term 
“enforceable” was not meant to be substantive law.  Finally, the term “irrevo-
cable” was not intended to elevate arbitration agreements to a special status 
untouchable by state law, but to address the other specific problem of the doc-
trine of the time—that an arbitration agreement “was subject to revocation by 
either party at any time before the award.”129  By eliminating this mutual and at-
will revocability—which had placed arbitration agreements at a unique disad-
vantage compared to other contracts—the FAA put arbitration agreements 
“upon the same footing as other contracts,” in the words of the House Report.130 
Section 2 qualifies the assertion that arbitration agreements shall be “valid, 
irrevocable and enforceable” with the clause, “save upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  Grounds for the “revo-
cation” of a contract include any issue of substantive contract law bearing on 
enforceability, including formation rules and defenses such as unconscionabil-
ity.131  The Supreme Court has recognized in this “savings clause” “the purpose 
of Congress in 1925 . . . to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other 
 
However, they conceded that the FAA merely “establishes a procedure in the Federal courts,” adding 
that “[i]t is no infringement upon the right of each State to decide for itself what contracts shall or shall 
not exist under its laws.”  Cohen & Dayton, supra note 83, at 276-77; ABA, Arbitration Law, supra note 
88, at 154-55.  Indeed, Cohen and the ABA were apparently sufficiently convinced that arbitration 
statutes were procedural law of the forum and not substantive law that they believed it would be neces-
sary to enact a separate procedural statute for the federal system and each state.  Such was the 
acknowledged game plan of the ABA.  See ABA, Arbitration Law, supra note 88, at 156. 
 128. S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924); see supra text accompanying note 95. 
 129. S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924). 
 130. H.R. REP. NO. 6-96, at 1 (1924). 
 131. In contrast to “revocation” of an offer, “revocation” of a contract would mean, more generally, 
“the vacating of an instrument previously made,” 2 BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY 2955 (8th ed. 1914), 
or “destroying or making void” the contract.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 261-63, 1036 (2d ed. 
1910). 
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contracts, but not more so.”132  More specifically, the FAA was intended to leg-
islatively overrule the ouster doctrine, which created procedural or remedial 
hurdles to enforcement of otherwise valid arbitration agreements, in part 
through mutual and at-will revocability.133  The savings clause was intended to 
reinforce the principle that substantive contract law in general would not be 
affected by the FAA and would govern the question whether a valid arbitration 
agreement exists in the first instance.134 
IV 
SOUTHLAND AS DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: “FORUM 
SHOPPING” AND THE “NATIONAL POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION” 
Whatever lip-service is paid to original intent as the proper basis for inter-
preting statutes, it is unrealistic to suppose that Southland would be overruled 
solely on the basis of its contradiction of Congress’s original intent.  Such a for-
malistic argument is unlikely to persuade because it fails to grapple with the 
terms on which the debate over the FAA’s meaning will truly be decided.135  The 
following sections attempt to address these other possible terms of debate. 
Southland provides an example of one aspect of “dynamic” statutory inter-
pretation: attributing a policy or purpose to a statute to address issues not con-
templated when the statute was enacted.136  Indeed, the decision might even be 
defended on the ground that, however modest the original FAA’s scope may 
have been in 1925, it is permissible to interpret the statute broadly to address 
related but unanticipated issues and effectuate related but unanticipated policy 
judgments that arose in later times, so long as the interpretation is not contra-
dicted by the statute’s language or intent.  Southland advances two such policy 
judgments: a policy against forum shopping and a national policy favoring arbi-
 
 132. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967). 
 133. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 75-78, 91. 
 134. Where was this substantive law to come from?  Under the Swift regime, the substantive law of 
contracts in the federal courts was largely federal or “general” common law, the decisional law of the 
federal courts.  But state statutes governing contracts were also supposed to be applied in federal court. 
After 1938, Erie, of course, meant that the general federal law of contracts was abolished.  Although it 
could be argued that the intent of the savings clause, drafted under the Swift regime, was to incorporate 
federal common law, such an interpretation is problematic because after Erie there would be no live 
federal common law to apply.  A better construction is that the substantive law of contracts incorpo-
rated in the savings clause is whatever law exists at any given time.  The FAA was to take its substan-
tive contract law as it found it.  As such, the general contract-law principles encompassed in the savings 
clause, post-Erie, would include not only state statutes, but also state decisional law.  The Supreme 
Court reached that conclusion without difficulty, holding that the savings clause preserves state-law 
contract defenses of general applicability.  “State law may be applied” to invalidate or regulate an arbi-
tration agreement, “if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforce-
ability of contracts generally.”  Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996) (quoting 
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987)). 
 135. “The practice of statutory interpretation does not follow any single inquiry (originalist or oth-
erwise).”  ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 13. 
 136. See id. at 48-60. 
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tration.  This Part demonstrates that these policy arguments, on close analysis, 
are weakened—perhaps completely vitiated—by the Court’s recent assertion 
that an arbitration clause is merely a form of forum-selection clause, with no 
impact on substantive rights.  At the same time, the federalism values essen-
tially ignored by Southland heavily outweigh Southland’s dubious policy ration-
ales. 
A. National Policy Against Forum Shopping? 
The Southland Court concluded that intolerable forum shopping would 
result if the same arbitration agreement could be enforced in federal diversity 
actions but not across the street in state court.  Although the Court said it was 
“unwilling to attribute to Congress” an intent to allow such forum shopping,137 
the Court’s argument is plainly a judicial policy argument dressed as one of 
congressional intent.  And as a matter of judicial policy, the Court’s concern 
about such forum shopping was misplaced. 
First, the problem is chimerical.  When federal jurisdiction is present, both 
parties have equal access to federal court: the plaintiff by choosing where to file, 
and the defendant by removal.138  Thus, even if the FAA were construed as a 
procedural statute applicable only in federal court, there would really be no sig-
nificant opportunity to forum shop—that is, to gain a litigation advantage 
unavailable to the adversary.139 
Second, who has cause to complain about forum shopping in a situation in 
which the federal court would send the case into arbitration, while the state 
court would allow the case to be litigated?  If the issue is one of clearing federal 
court dockets, then it is not a major concern to the federal courts that the state 
would preserve the judicial forum.  If the issue is one of fairness to the parties, 
then it has to be recognized that predispute arbitration agreements (those that 
are almost invariably involved in enforcement disputes) are themselves a form 
of contractual forum shopping.  The party drafting the typical predispute arbi-
tration agreement seeks to control the forum choice by contract, and since the 
adhering party is typically hampered by a large disparity in bargaining power, 
information about the value of the future forum choice, or both, the drafting 
 
 137. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 (1984). 
 138. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000). 
 139. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 33-34 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor did not 
address the possibility of a plaintiff’s keeping a case in state court by joining a nondiverse party as a 
defendant—for example, by adding an in-state employee as a defendant in a suit against an out-of-state 
corporation.  But a plaintiff’s ability to do this is limited to particular sets of facts and is likely to prove 
unsuccessful.  The diverse corporate defendant could petition a district court separately under section 4 
for an order staying litigation and compelling arbitration.  Because the nondiverse in-state employee 
would not be a necessary party to the petition, the federal court would have diversity jurisdiction over 
it. 
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party is able to forum shop at a bargain-basement price.140  Parties who impose 
such agreements should not be heard to cry “forum shopping.” 
Finally, forum shopping is a concern to judicial administration when the par-
ties are able to shop for favorable substantive or outcome determinative rules; it 
is not a problem when substantive rights will not be affected.  The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly asserted in its recent decisions that an arbitration clause is 
merely a specialized type of forum-selection clause that does not adversely 
affect anyone’s substantive rights.141  Thus, the enforcement vel non of an arbi-
tration agreement should not (theoretically) affect the outcome of a case—no 
more than would any forum-selection clause, under which the same substantive 
law would be applied by the alternate fora. 
The possibility of a different enforcement decision being made by state and 
federal courts in the same state should be no more troubling than is a situation 
in which state and federal courts follow different conflict-of-laws heuristics in 
deciding whether to enforce a forum-selection clause.  The Supreme Court has 
found this very situation to be entirely unproblematic.  In Stewart Organization 
v. Ricoh Corp.,142 for example, the Court held that a federal court sitting in 
diversity had to apply the federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), rather than 
state law, in determining what effect to give a contractual venue clause.143  The 
Court was not troubled by the fact that the state court would have denied 
enforcement pursuant to a state policy disfavoring forum-selection clauses, 
whereas the federal doctrine viewed such agreements more favorably.  Nothing 
in Stewart suggested that the federal procedural policy should somehow 
displace the Alabama rule in Alabama courts to prevent forum shopping.144  
Inconsistencies in procedural regimes between state and federal court have long 
been an accepted feature of our legal system.  Southland’s concern about forum 
shopping has thus been vitiated by subsequent Supreme Court decisions that 
assume away any substantive effects of arbitral versus judicial fora. 
B. The “National Policy Favoring Arbitration” 
Case law holding arbitration agreements to be mere matters of forum selec-
tion without any impact on substantive rights also undermines the second policy 
justification.  Since Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction 
Corp.,145 it has become commonplace in judicial decisions concerning the FAA 
to assert that there is a “national policy favoring arbitration.” 146  It is widely 
recognized, though apparently not very troubling to the courts, that this policy 
 
 140. See James Zimmerman, Restrictions on Forum-Selection Clauses in Franchise Agreements and 
the Federal Arbitration Act: Is State Law Preempted?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 759, 760-61 (1998). 
 141. See infra text accompanying notes 150, 189-96. 
 142. 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
 143. Id. at 32. 
 144. See id. at 31-32. 
 145. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 146. E.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
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was not the creation of the FAA as written by Congress, but was instead a judi-
cial creation—federal common law—that took the FAA as a point of depar-
ture.147  If the basis for this policy is a general dislike of litigation, or of certain 
claims, or a belief that it is convenient to enforce arbitration agreements to 
reduce crowded court dockets, then the policy is nothing more than a thinly-
veiled judicial value judgment.  The Supreme Court has not said this, though in 
Circuit City Stores v. Adams it comes very close.148  That value choice is debat-
able, and it is arguably a choice for legislators, not courts, to make. 
A more defensible jurisprudential argument is that of “dynamic” statutory 
interpretation.  According to this argument, Congress all along meant to 
encourage arbitration as much as possible in enacting the FAA.  While in 1925 
that may have been limited to ordinary commercial disputes between mer-
chants, the horizon of arbitration has expanded to include a much broader 
range of parties and claims.  Alternatively, it can be argued that irrespective of 
the intent of Congress in 1925, the need to manage court caseloads and the 
recent trend favoring “alternative dispute resolution” justify courts in adapting 
statutory tools placed at their disposal. 
The dynamic statutory interpretation argument is undermined by two flaws. 
First, Congress in 1925 did not intend to promote arbitration to the full extent 
of its power or anything like it.  It could have enacted a substantive regulation 
of interstate commerce, preempting state law, but it did not; it could have writ-
ten a procedural statute applicable to all contracts being litigated in federal 
court, whether in admiralty, federal question, or diversity, but it did not.  It 
wrote a savings clause intended to preserve a significant role for general con-
tract law and an exclusion clause designed to exempt employment contracts 
from FAA coverage.  Thus, it cannot be said that the FAA has always been a 
“full reach” statute that the courts have simply expanded to keep pace with the 
expansion of the Commerce Clause. 
Moreover, the federalism-based “clear-statement” rule of Gregory v. Ash-
croft149 dictates that the Court should not go far out in front of Congress in 
discovering national policies in silent statutes when the effect is such a large-
scale intrusion into state autonomy on a matter of traditional state regulation.  
Not only has Congress failed, in the FAA or otherwise, to identify alternative 
dispute resolution as a matter of pressing national concern that must be 
imposed on all levels of government, but on close inspection, one searches in 
 
 147. See Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There is 
little doubt that the Court’s interpretation of the Act has given it a scope far beyond the expectations of 
the Congress that enacted it.”); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional 
intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own 
creation.”). 
 148. See 532 U.S. at 122-23 (arguing that construing the FAA to apply to employment agreements is 
justified by the “real benefits to the enforcement of arbitration provisions” and by “the efficacy of al-
ternative dispute resolution procedures adopted by many of the Nation’s employers”). 
 149. 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991). 
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vain for any strong federal policy that is affected by a state court’s decision to, 
for instance, keep its courthouse doors open to state-law wage-and-hour claims.  
The Supreme Court has assured us that arbitration agreements have no impact 
on substantive rights.150 Like the choice between federal and state courts, the 
choice between court and arbitration, according to the Supreme Court, is a 
choice between two presumptively neutral and fair fora that are equally capable 
of applying the substantive law.  A “national policy favoring arbitration,” inso-
far as it is imposed on the states, is thus a federal policy requiring states to send 
a class of cases—those involving enforceable arbitration agreements—to arbi-
tration rather than allow any of them into state courts.  The federal interest in 
such close regulation of state dispute-resolution systems seems relatively weak. 
The Southland majority may also have been motivated to use the FAA as a 
vehicle to impose a national pro-arbitration policy on the states out of a lack of 
confidence in the states’ ability to find their own way toward alternative dispute 
resolution.  Such “try it, you’ll like it” paternalism, of course, does not fit with 
the values of the federalism revival.  In any event, the mistrust of the states has 
proven unjustified.  In general, most states have rigorously enforced arbitration 
agreements under state statutes similar to the FAA.151  State laws that create 
exceptions to an otherwise broad, general rule of enforcement—the laws pre-
empted by Southland—are the kinds of variation that should be tolerated in a 
federal system that values the states’ policymaking autonomy and experimenta-
tion. 
Southland’s creative attribution of policy rationales to the FAA might have 
been supportable if the issue were simply deciding the extent of the FAA’s 
application in a close case—for example, whether trial of nonarbitrable issues 
should be stayed until intertwined arbitrable issues are resolved in arbitration.152  
But when the issue is the displacement of state law, with the resulting encroach-
ment on important federalism values, the courts should be more careful with 
their policy attributions.  Southland can be faulted for treading too carelessly 
over substantial federalism values in the name of questionable national policies. 
 
 150. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 122-23; see infra text accompanying notes 189-96.  While I have argued 
that the Court is wrong in this conclusion, see Schwartz, supra note 52, at 110-21, the Court has not seen 
fit to adopt my point of view. 
 151. See supra note 55. 
 152. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 216 (1985) (holding that the policy 
favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements supported the rule that litigation should generally be 
stayed pending arbitration of intertwined claims). 
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V 
SOUTHLAND AS DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:  
“INTERVENING DEVELOPMENTS” IN THE FAA’S HISTORY, 1938-1995 
The theory of dynamic statutory interpretation also recognizes that the 
evolution of relevant background law can essentially change a statute’s meaning 
from its original intent.153  Justice Stevens seems to have been writing from this 
perspective in his separate Southland opinion when he allowed himself to be 
“persuaded that the intervening developments in the law compel the conclu-
sion” that the FAA preempts some state laws, notwithstanding his conviction 
that “the 1925 Congress that enacted the statute viewed the statute as essen-
tially procedural in nature.”154  He did not specify what these “intervening devel-
opments” are, but we can only assume that they include the two major post-
New Deal legal developments that would bear on the FAA: the application of 
the Erie doctrine to the FAA and the emergence of a judicial nationalism that 
combined deference to legislative judgments on interstate commerce with a 
broad, nationalist orientation on such matters as federal labor law, civil rights, 
and federal jurisdiction.155  Both of these developments distorted the FAA in 
ways that directly contributed to Southland.  But neither justifies continuing 
adherence to Southland. 
A. The Erie Problem in the FAA 
The present Southland conundrum is in large part the product of a sequence 
of missteps and non sequiturs in Supreme Court decisions attempting to resolve 
an Erie problem that never should have existed in the first place.  In essence, 
the Supreme Court first declared that the FAA was “substantive” law for Erie 
purposes, and then, to make the FAA applicable in diversity cases, claimed that 
the FAA was based exclusively on the commerce power.  Finally, in Southland, 
the Court concluded that any statute based on the commerce power must have 
been intended as substantive law binding on the states.  Not only did each step 
in this progression involve either a mistake or a non sequitur, but the whole 
structure collapses when one realizes that the premise that began it all—that the 
arbitration enforcement is “outcome determinative”—has been expressly 
rejected in modern cases. 
 
 153. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 61-68. 
 154. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).  Justice Stevens argued that the FAA preempts state laws limiting arbitration agreements in 
general, but that the savings clause preserves “certain substantive state policies that would be under-
mined by enforcing certain categories of arbitration clauses.”  Id. at 18. 
 155. Professor Thomas Metzloff has suggested that the “ADR movement” is itself an intervening 
development that may have been on Justice Stevens’s mind when he used this evocative phrase.  E-mail 
from Thomas Metzloff, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law, to David Schwartz, Assis-
tant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School (Dec. 2, 2002, 10:16 EST) (on file with 
author).  That suggestion was addressed above.  See supra Part IV.B. 
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1. Misstep: Arbitration as “Outcome Determinative” 
The Supreme Court first considered the impact of Erie on the FAA in 
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.156  The question presented was whether a district 
court in a diversity case could stay litigation and compel arbitration pursuant to 
section 3 of the FAA when the contract containing the arbitration clause fell 
outside the scope of section 2 of the Act.  The Supreme Court reasonably 
answered that question in the negative.157  The Erie problem arose because the 
Court, while acknowledging that arbitration was a form of procedure, never-
theless determined that the law governing arbitration agreements was “substan-
tive” for Erie purposes.  Under Erie, as construed by Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
York,158 a federal court sitting in diversity must apply state law on questions that 
“substantially affect the enforcement of the right as given by the state,” lest “the 
outcome of litigation . . . depend on the courthouse where the suit was 
brought.”159  Accordingly, state law would necessarily govern such “outcome 
determinative” matters as whether the parties would have a judicial or arbitral 
forum.160  If section 3 could stand alone, then Bernhardt would force the Court 
to consider the thorny problem, suggested by Erie, of whether Congress has the 
authority to create substantive—that is, “outcome determinative”—rules of 
decision applicable in diversity cases in federal court.  Indeed, the Bernhardt 
Court did consider whether a federal court could, as a federal judge-made pro-
cedural rule, compel arbitration in a diversity case in which the FAA did not 
apply—and determined under Erie that it could not.  Of course, the Court could 
have simply construed the FAA as inapplicable to all diversity cases to avoid 
the Erie problem once and for all.161  By instead construing section 3 as inappli-
cable to the case at bar on the narrower ground that no “interstate” contract 
was involved, the Bernhardt Court expressly put off for another day the thorny 
constitutional question it had created: what would happen if a dispute on a con-
tract that did involve interstate commerce—and therefore came within the 
scope of the FAA—appeared in federal court on diversity grounds?162 
 
 156. 350 U.S. 198 (1956). 
 157. Reasoning that “[FAA] Sections 1, 2 and 3 are integral parts of a whole,” the Court concluded 
that “the stay provided in § 3 reaches only those contracts covered by §§ 1 and 2.”  Id. at 201, 202.  This 
reasoning is plainly correct, since it makes no sense to read section 3 as a stand-alone command to 
enforce arbitration agreements without supplying the courts a rule by which to enforce them. 
 158. 326 U.S. 99 (1947). 
 159. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203 (citing Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 108). 
 160. 350 U.S. at 204-05.  Because it appeared that the arbitration agreement would not be enforce-
able under the law of Vermont, where the case was brought and where the contract was to be per-
formed, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether to apply 
Vermont law or the law of New York (the place of contracting), which would enforce the arbitration 
clause. 
 161. So Justice Frankfurter argued.  Id. at 207-09 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 162. Id. at 202. 
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2. Error: The Commerce Clause as the Exclusive Basis for the FAA 
That question arose in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing 
Co.,163 a diversity action in which the plaintiff sought damages for fraud in the 
inducement of a contract.  The lower courts and the Supreme Court agreed that 
the contract involved interstate commerce and therefore came within the FAA.  
The Supreme Court held further that the fraud claim was arbitrable and that, 
therefore, the suit should be stayed under section 3 until the claim could be 
arbitrated.164  The Court thus had to resolve whether it was constitutionally 
permissible to apply the FAA—now deemed “outcome determinative” under 
Bernhardt—in a diversity case.  The Prima Paint Court reasoned that “[t]he 
question . . . is not whether Congress may fashion federal substantive rules to 
govern questions arising in simple diversity cases,” as Bernhardt had suggested, 
but rather “whether Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct 
themselves with respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly has 
power to legislate.”165  The Court concluded that Congress clearly has such 
power under the Commerce Clause and that “it is clear beyond dispute that the 
federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined to the incontestable fed-
eral foundations of ‘control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.’”166 
Prima Paint’s distinction between “simple diversity cases” and those raising 
“subject matter over which Congress plainly has power to legislate” addressed 
old, unfinished business of constitutional law stemming from Erie rather than 
creating a brave new Federal Arbitration Act.  Erie’s essential holding is that 
the federal courts are without power to create substantive rules of decision on 
“common law” matters on which Congress cannot, or has not chosen to, legis-
late.  However, a jurisprudential disagreement subsequently emerged as to 
whether Erie also suggests that Congress lacks that power in diversity cases.167  
The disagreement seems misplaced insofar as Erie should not have been read to 
imply any particular limits on the extent of Congress’s power, other than the 
truism, of course, that Congress cannot make substantive rules—for the federal 
courts or otherwise—on matters beyond its enumerated powers.168  Thus, Erie 
 
 163. 388 U.S. 395 (1966). 
 164. Id. at 403-04. 
 165. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404-05. 
 166. Id. at 405 (emphasis added) (quoting  H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 
(1924)). 
 167. Compare Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Congress has no power to 
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state.”), with id. at 91-92 (Reed, J., concurring) 
(“If the opinion commits this Court to the position that the Congress is without power to declare what 
rules of substantive law shall govern the federal courts, that conclusion also seems questionable.”).  
Chief Justice Stone commented to Justice Roberts in 1941 that Erie “had not settled the issue of 
whether Congress could enact substantive rules of law for the federal courts in diversity suits ‘notwith-
standing some unfortunate dicta in the opinion.’”  PURCELL, supra note 86, at 202 (quoting Letter from 
Harlan F. Stone to Owen J. Roberts (Jan. 3, 1941)). 
 168. In context, Erie’s “Congress has no power” language refers only to the doctrine of enumerated 
powers.  See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.  To begin with, Erie involved subject matter that was plainly within 
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confirms the uncontroversial notion that Congress cannot enact “substantive” 
rules of decision in diversity cases involving purely state-law rights on matters 
beyond the enumerated powers—”simple diversity cases” in the words of Prima 
Paint. 
Prima Paint addressed the related but different question of whether Con-
gress can enact substantive, or “outcome determinative,” rules of decision to 
apply in diversity cases concerning matters within its enumerated powers. Can 
Congress “prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves with respect 
to subject matter over which Congress plainly has power to legislate”—for 
instance, under the commerce clause?  The Prima Paint Court answered 
“yes.”169  There was no need to find in the FAA an intent to create a substantive 
right, one that would be enforceable in state court, and preempt state law, to 
hold that the FAA created a substantive or outcome determinative rule appli-
cable in federal court.  And the Prima Paint Court did not take that step, hold-
ing only that “[f]ederal courts are bound to apply rules enacted by Congress 
with respect to matters—here, a contract involving commerce—over which it 
has legislative power.”170  Indeed, Prima Paint seems to hew to the notion that 
the FAA, though outcome determinative, is procedural law: a set of rules “pre-
scrib[ing] how federal courts are to conduct themselves” rather than “substan-
tive rules to govern . . . simple diversity cases.”171 
There is nothing strange about this aspect of Prima Paint.  Since Hanna v. 
Plumer,172 decided a year before Prima Paint, it has been established that federal 
courts will apply federal rules that are in some sense “substantive” and that may 
differ from the state law “across the street.”  In Hanna, the Court held that a 
federal procedural rule was applicable in a diversity case to keep a plaintiff’s 
claim alive, notwithstanding that the governing state rule would have mandated 
dismissal and that the choice of law was therefore “outcome determinative.”173  
Because a valid congressional enactment applied to the situation,174 there was no 
 
Congress’s enumerated powers.  Although Tompkins was not a railroad employee, and therefore did 
not come within any existing federal statute, the consitutionality of FELA left little doubt that Con-
gress clearly did have the power to enact legislation to cover injuries caused by railroads—even under 
the pre-New Deal understanding of the Commerce Clause.  See The Second Employers’ Liability 
Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 51-52 (1912) (upholding FELA as a permissible commerce regulation).  Further, Erie 
elsewhere faults Swift for its assumption of “power to declare rules of decision which Congress was con-
fessedly without power to enact as statutes.”  Erie, 304 U.S. at 72.  The thrust of the opinion was the 
Court’s own assertion of unconstitutional lawmaking power, not any such assertion by Congress.  In 
context, Congress’s lack of power to impose “common law” on the states meant it could not impose 
“non-statutory law”—that is, Congress could not issue a broad, general authorization to federal courts 
to make general, non-statutory law extending beyond its enumerated powers.  See PURCELL, supra 
note 86, at 178-80, 202. 
 169. See 388 U.S. at 405. 
 170. Id. at 406. 
 171. Id. at 405 (emphasis added). 
 172. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 173. 380 U.S. at 466-67. 
 174. The Congressional enactment was the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000), which 
authorized the promulgation of the Federal Rules.  See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464. 
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Erie problem, period.  Even though the Erie doctrine was understood to 
prohibit Congress from “fashion[ing] rules which are not supported by a grant 
of federal authority contained in . . . the Constitution,”175 nevertheless “Erie and 
its offspring cast no doubt on the long-recognized power of Congress to pre-
scribe housekeeping rules for federal courts even though some of those rules 
will inevitably differ from comparable state rules.”176  This power over “house-
keeping” rules, the Court has subsequently explained, “falls comfortably within 
Congress’s powers under Article III as augmented by the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.”177  What Hanna v. Plumer held in the context of a procedural law 
enacted pursuant to Article III, Prima Paint held in the context of a law that 
seemed to fall “within the uncertain area between substance and procedure,”178 
enacted (so the Prima Paint Court said) pursuant to the commerce power.  This 
feature of federal law continues to the present day: if a federal statute comes 
within the powers of Congress, it binds the federal courts, and no Erie problem 
is raised by the application of a different rule in state court, even though the 
rule may be in some sense substantive or outcome determinative.179 
The Prima Paint Court erred, however, in asserting that the FAA’s basis 
was “confined to” Congress’s interstate commerce and admiralty power.  That 
assertion is flat out wrong: As we have seen, the legislative history shows that 
Congress placed primary reliance for enacting the FAA on its control over the 
procedures of the federal courts.180  In Prima Paint, however, the Court stopped 
short of making the more far-reaching error of suggesting that reliance on the 
Commerce Clause necessarily implied an intent to impose federal substantive 
law on the states.  That error that would be made in Moses H. Cone and South-
land. 
3. Non Sequitur: From Commerce Clause to Substantive Law 
Although Southland builds on Prima Paint’s error in attributing the FAA 
solely to Congress’s interstate commerce and admiralty powers, Southland did 
not follow inexorably from Prima Paint.  It is, on the contrary, a non sequitur.  
Prima Paint could and should have been understood as clarifying that the 
Commerce Clause, no less than Article III and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, can be the basis for a federal rule applicable in federal but not state 
courts.  But in Southland, the Court trampled over this clarification.  The 
Southland Court began its preemption analysis with Prima Paint’s (partially 
mistaken) determination that Congress rested the FAA on “its broad power to 
 
 175. 380 U.S. at 471. 
 176. Id. at 473. 
 177. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988). 
 178. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472. 
 179. See Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 32 n.11 (“Because a validly enacted Act of Congress controls the 
issue in dispute”—whether a federal court would enforce a contractual venue clause which would be 
invalid in state court—”we have no occasion to evaluate the impact of application of federal judge-
made law on the ‘twin aims’ that animate the Erie doctrine.”). 
 180. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause.”181  These statements from 
Prima Paint, according to the Southland majority, “clearly implied that the sub-
stantive rules of the Act were to apply in state as well as federal courts.”182  As 
shown above, however, they “clearly implied” nothing of the sort.  It may be 
true, as the Southland majority went on to say, that when Congress exercises its 
commerce power, it “normally” creates substantive regulations applicable in 
state as well as federal courts.183  But, as Justice Black’s dissent in Prima Paint 
pointed out, the creation of substantive rights “normally” goes hand-in-hand 
with the creation of federal subject matter jurisdiction, and the absence of such 
jurisdiction shows that the FAA is not the “normal” exercise of commerce 
power the Southland majority wished to make it.184 
More importantly, Southland’s assertion that Congress necessarily binds the 
states and broadly preempts inconsistent state policies whenever it acts pursu-
ant to the Commerce Clause is very bad federalism and plainly wrong as a 
matter of constitutional law.  To begin with, it is inconsistent with modern pre-
emption doctrine, which has expressly replaced presumed preemption with a 
congressional intent approach.185  Under the modern approach, Congress can 
decide not to preempt state law at all, or to “save” state law, in whole or in part, 
when it legislates under the Commerce Clause.  Assuming for the sake of argu-
ment that section 2 is substantive law, a natural reading of the savings clause 
would be that state substantive law is preserved, at least in state court.  Fur-
thermore, Southland goes badly astray by implying that only by invoking the 
heavy hand of preemption can Congress avoid constitutional infirmity under 
Erie—that the Erie principle is violated by a substantive federal rule applicable 
in diversity cases but not binding on the states, so that Erie requires making 
such a rule a full-blown federal substantive right.  That would be ironic indeed 
in light of Erie’s federalist purpose to preserve state lawmaking autonomy. 186 
Finally, it cannot be overlooked that the Supreme Court had bookended the 
FAA’s enactment with its decisions in Red Cross Line and Marine Transit, both 
of which held that arbitration-enforcement statutes—the New York Arbitration 
Law, on which the FAA was patterned, and later the FAA itself—are not sub-
stantive law.187  Bernhardt was consistent with these decisions, merely updating 
 
 181. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 
 182. Id. at 12. 
 183. Id. 
 184. It is ironic that the Southland majority opinion relies on Justice Black’s dissent for the proposi-
tion that exercise of the commerce power normally implies preemptive effect in state court.  Id. at 12 
(citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 420 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting)).  
Justice Black was arguing that, because federal question jurisdiction “normally” arises from federal 
substantive law, the absence of federal question jurisdiction under the FAA “militate[s] against the 
view that Congress was creating a body of federal substantive law.”  Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 420 
(Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  Here we have an excellent example of standing an argument 
on its head. 
 185. See supra text accompanying notes 113-114. 
 186. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938). 
 187. See supra notes 98, 115. 
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them in post-Erie terms by holding that arbitration enforcement, while proce-
dural in form, is substantive in effect because it is outcome determinative.  
Prima Paint was likewise consistent with these precedents: It merely held that 
Congress’s authority to enact substantive law under the Commerce Clause 
encompasses the lesser-included power to enact quasi-substantive rules of pro-
cedure governing federal courts.  But Southland’s leap from Prima Paint to a 
holding that the FAA is substantive law binding on the states departed from 
this line of cases and sub silentio overruled Red Cross Line and Marine Transit. 
4. The Illusory Erie Problem: The FAA Is Not Substantive Law After All 
The Erie problem was conjured into existence only by Bernhardt’s conclu-
sion that arbitration enforcement is outcome determinative and therefore sub-
stantive law for Erie purposes.  Bernhardt acknowledged that the FAA is at 
least formally procedural, a conclusion consistent with the legal understanding 
of the FAA, both in the courts and Congress, prior to Erie.188  Had Bernhardt 
decided that the FAA was not outcome determinative, there would have been 
no problem applying it in diversity cases and no need for the Prima Paint Court 
to state, incorrectly, that the FAA’s basis is “confined to” the Commerce 
Clause.  Far more disturbing, however, is that the Erie problem identified in 
Bernhardt and solved in Prima Paint no longer exists because the premise on 
which it was based—Bernhardt’s conclusion that the FAA is outcome determi-
native—is no longer good law. 
Bernhardt’s characterization of the FAA as “outcome determinative” was 
based on Wilko v. Swan,189 a 1953 decision holding that the right to a judicial 
forum in federal Securities Act cases is “a substantial right” and therefore non-
waivable under a substantive anti-waiver provision of the Securities Act.190  
Bernhardt, tracking a nearly identical passage in Wilko, opined that arbitration 
enforcement is substantive in its implications because arbitration is an inferior 
form of dispute resolution for important substantive claims.  Enforcement of an 
arbitration clause could therefore have a substantive effect on the outcome of 
legal disputes.191  But Wilko has since been overruled on this very point.  Its 
“general suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and the competence of arbi-
 
 188. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text. 
 189. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477 
(1989). 
 190. Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2000), prohibits any “condition, 
stipulation, or provision” that purports to require a securities purchaser to “waive [the seller’s] compli-
ance with any provision.”  Wilko construed this section as prohibiting enforcement of arbitration 
agreements because they waive the right to a judicial forum.  See 346 U.S. at 434-35. 
 191. The Bernhardt Court opined, 
[T]he remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially affects the 
cause of action created by the State. . . .  Arbitrators do not have the benefit of judicial instruc-
tion on the law; they need not give their reasons for their results; the record of their proceed-
ings is not as complete as it is in a court trial; and judicial review of an award is more limited 
than judicial review of a trial—all as discussed in Wilko v. Swan . . . . 
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-38). 
SCHWARTZ_GLOBAL.FMT.DOC 10/14/2004  10:22 AM 
Winter/Spring 2004]  FEDERALISM MISTAKES IN FAA INTERPRETATION 39 
tral tribunals”192 has been deemed “far out of step with our current strong 
endorsement” of arbitration under the FAA.193  The Court has specifically 
rejected Wilko’s determination that arbitration affects substantive rights, calling 
the selection of an arbitral versus a judicial forum merely “procedural.”194  The 
Court’s recent FAA cases repeatedly assert that arbitration agreements are “in 
effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause”195 and that a party com-
pelled to arbitrate “does not forgo . . . substantive rights” but “only submits to 
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”196 
In retrospect, the Bernhardt Court was in error—at least in light of current 
doctrine—in holding arbitration enforcement to be an outcome determinative, 
and therefore substantive, right.  There need not have been any Erie problem to 
prompt the Court to look for substantive congressional authority for the FAA.  
And Prima Paint compounded the mistake by stating in terms far too strong in 
light of the legislative history that the FAA was confined to Congress’s com-
merce power.  Southland took this error-built-upon-error and added a non 
sequitur: If Congress acted under the commerce power, it must have done so 
with the intent to exercise that power against the states to the fullest, to create 
substantive law enforceable in state court and to preempt contrary state law.  In 
so holding, Southland is squarely inconsistent with the current line of cases 
holding that enforcement of arbitration agreements has no impact on substan-
tive rights. 
B. The Judicial Nationalist Revision of the FAA 
A second set of intervening developments that might be seen as justifying 
Southland under a dynamic theory of statutory construction is a parallel history 
of substantive-law federalism that distorted the FAA no less than the Court’s 
struggles with the Erie doctrine.  This does not refer to the dramatic expansion 
of what the courts accepted as the legitimate scope of the commerce power, 
whose impact on the interpretation of the FAA has been relatively easy to per-
ceive.197  More subtle, but equally far-reaching, has been the impact of the civil 
 
 192. Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231 (1987) (questioning and limiting Wilko). 
 193. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989) (overruling Wilko). 
 194. Id. at 482. 
 195. Id. at 482-83 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)); accord EEOC v. 
Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 296 (2002) (holding that an arbitration agreement is “effectively a forum 
selection clause”). 
 196. E.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)), quoted in Circuit City Stores 
v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001). 
 197. It is generally accepted that in 1925 Congress held a view of its commerce power that was rela-
tively consonant with the narrow parameters to which the Supreme Court tried to hold it prior to 1937.  
In modern times, the courts expanded the scope of the FAA to keep pace with the expansion of the 
commerce power, and in 1995, in Allied-Bruce, the Supreme Court held that the coverage language 
applying the FAA to any “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” extended, in essence, 
to any contract affecting interstate commerce, the broadest possible reach the statute could have.  See 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995).  That expansion did not occur all at 
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rights–oriented judicial nationalism of the 1950s through 1970s.  Two prominent 
features of this trend were the Court’s somewhat mistrustful attitude toward 
state governments and state courts and its furtherance of the nationalization of 
labor law.  The judicial nationalism of this era left a deep imprint on the FAA 
through two instances of result-oriented and strained statutory interpretation. 
1. Judicial Nationalism, the FAA, and Federal Labor Law 
A significant chapter in the FAA’s transformation from a procedural statute 
into a broad, substantive federal policy is its intertwining with federal labor law.  
By the 1940s, arbitration of disputes under collective bargaining agreements 
had emerged as a contractual tradeoff for the right to strike.198 Labor unions 
resorted to the courts with increasing frequency to seek enforcement of arbitra-
tion provisions in collective bargaining agreements, arguing in some cases that 
the FAA mandated enforcement.199  Following the enactment of the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA) 200 —also known as the Taft-Hartley Act—
in 1947, the lower federal courts divided sharply over whether and how labor 
arbitration agreements could be enforced.  Some lower courts found, by 
implication from section 301 of the LMRA, the judicial power to stay litigation, 
order arbitration, and confirm arbitration awards.201  Other courts were reluc-
tant to do so, finding the FAA to be safer statutory ground.202  It may be difficult 
today to appreciate the magnitude of this issue, on which nothing less than 
nationwide freedom from industrial strife seemed to be at stake.  Given the 
doubts about the applicability of section 301 of the LMRA, courts and commen-
 
once.  Compare Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 200-01 (1956) (holding that a contract 
made in New York for a sales representative to be employed in Vermont did not involve interstate 
commerce), with Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 105 (holding that an intrastate employment contract for 
a retail store employee is covered by the FAA as a contract involving commerce). 
 198. See Archibald Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1954); 
see also Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960) (stating that arbitration is a quid pro 
quo for the right to strike). 
 199. Unions sought enforcement of arbitration agreements in three contexts: to stay employer dam-
ages suits for breaches of no-strike agreements, see, e.g., Tenney Eng’g v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. 
Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953) (en banc); to compel the employer’s participation in grievance 
arbitration, see, e.g., Amalgated Ass’n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Penn. Grey-
hound Lines, 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1952); and to enforce arbitration awards, see, e.g., Mercury Oil Ref. 
Co. v. Oil Workers Int’l Union, 187 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1951). 
 200. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-67, 171-83, 185-87, 557 (2000). 
 201. See, e.g., Textile Workers v. Am. Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137, 142 (D. Mass. 1953); Evening 
Star Newspaper Co. v. Columbia Typographical Union, 124 F. Supp. 322 (D.D.C. 1954). 
 202. See Signal-Stat Corp. v. United Elec., 235 F.2d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding that because the 
FAA applied to a labor arbitration agreement, “[we] need not decide, whether the arbitration agree-
ment is enforceable under Section 301”).  Other courts held both section 301 of the LMRA and the 
FAA inapplicable, concluding that collective bargaining agreements are “contracts of employment 
of . . . workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” excluded from FAA coverage under section 
1.  See, e.g., Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters, 217 F.2d 49, 52 (6th Cir. 1954). 
SCHWARTZ_GLOBAL.FMT.DOC 10/14/2004  10:22 AM 
Winter/Spring 2004]  FEDERALISM MISTAKES IN FAA INTERPRETATION 41 
tators alike “strove mightily” to find theories by which the FAA would apply to 
enforce labor arbitration agreements.203 
The Supreme Court eventually decided the issue in Textile Workers Union v. 
Lincoln Mills,204 holding that section 301(a) of the LMRA granted jurisdiction in 
the federal courts to create a body of substantive federal law of labor arbitra-
tion, including the power to compel arbitration, that “the courts must fashion 
from the policy of our national labor laws.”205  Though the question of the appli-
cability of the FAA was before the Court, the majority opinion did not mention 
the FAA one way or the other, leaving disagreement over the FAA’s applica-
bility to linger in the lower courts.206  While the question has become somewhat 
academic, the FAA’s applicability to labor arbitration has never been resolved.  
Moreover, by approving the federal courts’ practice of “look[ing] to the [FAA] 
for guidance in labor arbitration cases,”207 the Supreme Court has, wittingly or 
not, reinforced the nationalist pull of federal labor law on the FAA.  Had the 
Court taken the opportunity in Lincoln Mills to divorce the FAA from federal 
labor law, there would have been less historical impetus to turn the FAA into a 
federal policy preemptive of state law.208 
 
 203. Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1368 (1997); see Cox, supra note 198, at 593 (devising theories to support applica-
tion of the FAA to collective bargaining agreements).  The leading case applying the FAA to labor 
arbitration agreements was Tenney Engineering v. United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, 207 
F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953) (en banc), whose reasoning has been regarded as strained both then and now.  
See Cox, supra note 198, at 606; Estreicher, supra, at 1368.  The problem with these arguments, of 
course, is the extensive historical record to the effect that the FAA was not intended to apply to labor 
or employment contracts.  See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 466-67 (1957) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1085-92 (9th Cir. 1998), over-
ruled by Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Matthew W. Finkin, “Workers’ Contracts” 
Under the United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & 
LAB. L. 282 (1997).  Nevertheless, result-oriented courts applied the FAA to labor arbitration by 
holding that the employment contracts exclusion in section 1 should be construed narrowly to apply 
only to transportation workers.  The Lincoln Mills decision should have “removed the need for such 
creative readings,” Estreicher, supra, at 1367, but Tenney was adapted and followed in later decades by 
courts that wanted to enforce arbitration agreements in individual employment contracts, culminating 
in the Supreme Court’s recent Circuit City decision.  See supra text accompanying notes 61-66. 
 204. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
 205. Id. at 456. 
 206. Compare Miller v. Public Storage, 121 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the FAA does 
not apply to collective bargaining agreements), with Md. Cas. Co. v. Realty Advisory Bd., 107 F.3d 979, 
982 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the FAA applies to collective bargaining agreements except where the 
narrow section 1 “workers” exclusion applies). 
 207. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987). 
 208. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Lincoln Mills, argued that the FAA does not apply to labor 
disputes and that the majority’s failure to rely on or mention the FAA implied agreement on that point: 
“I would make this rejection [of the FAA] explicit . . . .”  353 U.S. at 466 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), the Court took 
pains—although, again, without mentioning the FAA expressly—to distinguish labor arbitration from 
“commercial” arbitration.  See id. at 578 (distinguishing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)). 
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2. Judicial Nationalism, the FAA, and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital 
Civil rights–oriented judicial nationalism, whose heyday is indelibly associ-
ated with the Warren Court era, might be broadly characterized by a mistrust of 
state courts and state institutions and a reliance on federal courts as a primary 
forum for enforcement of civil rights.  A corollary of the latter trend is the per-
ceived need to keep the federal courthouse doors open to civil rights claimants.  
The federal judiciary has always been divided on these substantive values, of 
course, and the judicial battles over substance in this era were frequently 
encoded as controversies over technical doctrines of federal procedure and 
jurisdiction, such as standing and the power of federal courts to enjoin state liti-
gation.209 
These two strands of judicial nationalism—revolving around labor and civil 
rights—are historically intertwined.  They came together with the FAA in 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.210  The case 
originated as a purely state-law dispute based on a contract for construction of a 
hospital addition.  The hospital sued in state court, where, apparently con-
cerned about an arbitration clause in the contract, it obtained an ex parte order 
enjoining Mercury from seeking enforcement of the arbitration clause—in 
effect enjoining Mercury from petitioning a federal district court to compel 
arbitration.  The state court lifted the stay as soon as Mercury appeared in the 
action and objected, though the damage may well have been done in terms of 
offending the sensibilities of a federal judge sensitive to issues of civil rights.  
Mercury thereupon filed a diversity action in federal district court petitioning 
for a stay of the state-court case and an order compelling the hospital to arbi-
trate, pursuant to section 4 of the FAA.  The district court, however, stayed the 
federal case in deference to the preexisting state case, and the appeal from the 
grant of the stay reached the Supreme Court.211 
The principal issue presented to the Court was not in fact a dispute over the 
proper interpretation of the FAA, but rather an issue of federal abstention: 
whether, under the Colorado River doctrine,212 it was proper for the federal 
court to stay the federal lawsuit in deference to the state-court case.  The Court, 
per Justice Brennan, held that the district court erred by staying the federal 
action because doing so frustrated the policy implicit in the FAA’s procedures 
favoring speedy resolution of the issue of enforceability of arbitration agree-
 
 209.  See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (using the standing doctrine to dismiss a chal-
lenge to alleged race discrimination in zoning); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (restricting fed-
eral courts’ power to enjoin state-court proceedings).  Specific examples of this type of civil rights dis-
pute being encoded in procedural terms fill thousands of pages of treatises and casebooks on 
constitutional law and federal jurisdiction. 
 210. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 211. Id. at 4-8. 
 212. See Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (holding that the 
pendency of an action in state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in a federal 
court having jurisdiction). 
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ments.  That conclusion would have sufficed to resolve the case and would have 
been consistent with an understanding of the FAA as fundamentally proce-
dural.  But the Court went on.  To buttress its conclusion that abstention was 
improper, the Court found it useful to add that “federal law provides the rule of 
decision on the merits” when stays pending arbitration are at issue, and specifi-
cally that the FAA governs the issue of arbitrability in either state or federal 
court: 
Section 2 [of the FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favor-
ing arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural poli-
cies to the contrary.  The effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive 
law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the 
act.213 
Reading these sweeping statements, one cannot help but feel that the decision 
had very little to do with the actual FAA and very much to do with the judicial 
nationalist issues that were by 1983 receding quickly into the past.  The notion 
that a federal court would stay litigation in deference to state court (let alone 
that a state court would try to enjoin a federal suit) would have been anathema 
to judges like Justice Brennan, whose judicial philosophy took shape in the era 
of official state obstruction of civil rights; Moses H. Cone might well have struck 
Justice Brennan and some of his colleagues as an opportunity to make good 
civil rights law in the coded form of neutral procedural and prudential rules. 
At the same time, the Court’s language about the federal pro-arbitration 
policy could have been lifted straight from Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers 
Trilogy.214  Significantly, the analogy between federal labor policy and the FAA 
is faulty.  Arbitration pursuant to collective bargaining agreements is a part of a 
substantive national labor policy.  It is a quid pro quo for a union’s giving up the 
right to strike, and therefore a “stabilizing” and “therapeutic” influence that 
promotes “industrial stabilization” and “industrial peace” nationwide.215  Arbi-
 
 213. 460 U.S. at 24.  In a footnote, the opinion recognizes that this reading of the FAA “creates 
something of an anomaly in the field of federal court jurisdiction” because the statute creates “a body 
of federal substantive law” without conferring “independent federal question jurisdiction.”  Id. at 25 
n.32. 
 214. Compare Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450 (1957) (holding that sec-
tion 201(a) of the LMRA “authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforce-
ment of these collective bargaining agreements”), and Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 
(1960) (stating that judicial role is that “of developing a meaningful body of law to govern the interpre-
tation and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements”), and Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 577-78 (1960) (stating that the enforcement of arbitration agreements is 
“a major factor” in achieving “[t]he present federal policy . . . to promote industrial stabilization”), and 
id. at 582 (“[The] congressional policy in favor of settlement of disputes by the parties through the 
machinery of arbitration” requires that “doubts [about the scope of an arbitration clause] should be 
resolved in favor of coverage.”), and Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 
(1960) (holding that judicial review of arbitration awards must be limited to protect “[t]he federal 
policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration”), with Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24 (“[T]he effect of 
[FAA section 2] is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability applicable to any arbitra-
tion agreement within the coverage of the act.”), and id. (“[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be 
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.”). 
 215. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-68; Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578. 
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tration pursuant to the FAA is simply an alternative to litigation.  The Supreme 
Court recognized the distinction at the time,216 but seems to have forgotten the 
distinction in its discussions of the FAA during the 1980s. 
C. Assessing the “Intervening Developments” 
The “intervening developments” to which Justice Stevens referred as “com-
pelling” Southland’s basic conclusion that section 2 of the FAA preempts state 
law are undoubtedly those discussed above: the Moses H. Cone decision and the 
Bernhardt-Prima Paint handling of the FAA’s perceived Erie problem.  Yet, on 
closer analysis, these can hardly in themselves justify a decision that is wrong on 
the merits.  What do these developments amount to?  The Bernhardt-Prima 
Paint-Southland chain of reasoning is internally flawed and came into existence 
to solve the now nonexistent Erie problem of an outcome determinative FAA.  
The judicial nationalist history of the federal courts after the New Deal effected 
numerous changes from which there is doubtless no going back.  But South-
land’s holding is not one of them.  It is not a principle deeply embedded in our 
law, but rather an extension of some superficial reasoning from a recent-vintage 
case: Moses H. Cone’s false analogy between the FAA on the one hand and 
federal labor arbitration and civil rights judicial nationalism on the other. 
VI 
STARE DECISIS AND THE COURT’S OBLIGATION  
TO CORRECT ITS OWN FEDERALISM MISTAKES 
Although five Justices of the current Supreme Court have at some point dis-
sented from Southland’s basic conclusion, their opposition has never been uni-
fied in a single case.  In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, Justice 
O’Connor reluctantly abandoned her opposition to Southland: “Though 
wrong,” Southland was by then supported by stare decisis, which the Court has 
said has “special force” in statutory interpretation cases.217  Absent “‘special jus-
tification’ to overrule Southland,” she felt compelled to “acquiesce” in the 
majority’s admittedly faulty judgment.218  The three Southland dissenters remain 
on the Court, but none remains of the six Justices who formed the majority.  It 
is conceivable that most or all the current Justices believe Southland is wrong 
but that a majority will continue to support it on stare decisis grounds alone.  
Like Justice Scalia, however, “I do not believe that proper application of stare 
decisis prevents correction of the mistake” of Southland.219 
 
 216. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578 (distinguishing labor arbitration from 
commercial arbitration). 
 217. 513 U.S. at 284 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 
U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989)). 
 218. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)). 
 219. Id. at 286 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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A. Statutory Stare Decisis Concerns 
Two concerns emerge from the relevant case law as salient justifications for 
the doctrine of giving special weight to stare decisis in statutory interpretation 
cases.220 One is a kind of congressional reliance interest.  The courts often pre-
sume that Congress legislates with knowledge of background law,221 and there 
may be instances in which Congress builds on a foundation of Supreme Court 
statutory interpretations.222  But Congress may also build on nonstatutory case 
law, so this reliance argument does not justify giving special weight to statutory 
precedents.223 In any event, the congressional reliance interest is not very strong 
in the context of Southland because Congress has not amended the FAA in any 
way relevant to its preemptive effect since Southland.224 
The other consideration weighing against overruling statutory interpretation 
precedents is the notion that “Congress remains free to alter what we have 
done.”225  That argument is something of a makeweight.  It applies equally to 
common law precedents, which benefit from no special rule of stare decisis, 
“and it is also a fairly lame argument.  If the Court errs, why should the legisla-
ture have to make the correction?”226 It can also be argued that congressional 
acquiescence is a form of tacit approval of statutory precedents, but, again, the 
same could be said for common law precedents, and it is a stretch to attribute 
such definitive meaning to congressional inaction. 
 
 220. It is beyond the scope of this Article to engage in detail with the interesting scholarly debates 
over the justifications for statutory stare decisis.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory 
Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988); Rafael Gely, Of Sinking and Escalating: A (Somewhat) New Look 
at Stare Decisis, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 89 (1998).  For an argument rejecting the conventional justi-
fications for statutory stare decisis, but arguing that the doctrine is justified as a matter of democratic 
theory, see Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory 
Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1989). 
 221. This is a dubious assumption.  See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Leg-
islative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 597-600 (2002) (using an empiri-
cal study to demonstrate, among other things, that legislative staffs often forego substantial legal 
research when drafting statutes). 
 222. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 792 (1998) (holding that stare decisis 
concerns are amplified by the likelihood that congressional amendments to the employment discrimina-
tion statute expanding employers’ liability may have relied on earlier holdings about limits on employer 
liability). 
 223. See Eskridge, supra note 220, at 1401-02. 
 224. The only amendment to sections 1 through 4 of the FAA since the statute’s enactment was the 
purely technical change of terminology in 1954 from “court of the United States” to “United States 
District Court” in section 4 to bring the provisions into conformity with present terms and practice.  
Act of Sept. 3, 1954, c. 1263, § 19, 68 Stat. 1233; see Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 29 n.18 
(1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  While the farfetched argument could be made that Congress, in cre-
ating new business for the federal courts, was counting on a quantum of federal cases being swept into 
arbitration, it is even more farfetched that Congress might have so relied on state-court dockets being 
cleared in that way. 
 225. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 226. Eskridge, supra note 220, at 1403. 
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Leaving it to Congress in the case of Southland provokes a further objec-
tion: When, as here, the Court’s statutory construction is flawed by a failure to 
give proper weight to federalism values, shrugging the problem off to Congress 
runs counter to the Court’s recently espoused federalism principles.  The deci-
sions in United States v. Lopez227 and United States v. Morrison228 expressly 
rejected the theory that Congress, in whose political processes the states are 
represented, can by itself sufficiently protect federalism values and properly 
weigh them against perceived national legislative needs.229  To say that only 
Congress can correct federalism mistakes made by the Court in statutory inter-
pretation is completely at odds with the Lopez-Morrison assertion of the judi-
cial role in protecting federalism.  There is no reason to believe that Congress 
will be more attentive to federalism concerns in reviewing judicial interpreta-
tions of its past enactments than it is in passing laws in the first instance.230 
B. “Special Justifications”: Southland as a Latter-Day Swift v. Tyson 
The Court has not specified what “special justifications” support overruling 
a statutory precedent.  Whatever they may be, an undeniable special justifica-
tion exists for overruling Southland.  In Allied-Bruce, the Court turned aside a 
request to overrule Southland, relying in part on the observation that “no sub-
sequent cases have eroded Southland’s authority.”231  The Court thus over-
looked Southland’s inconsistency with recent Supreme Court decisions holding 
that arbitration enforcement is a matter of procedure with no impact on sub-
stantive rights.232  Indeed, with the exception of Moses H. Cone and Southland, 
the Court has been fairly consistent, dating all the way back to Justice Bran-
deis’s opinion in Red Cross Line, in maintaining that the arbitration statutes are 
not substantive commerce regulation.233 
 
 227. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act). 
 228. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the civil enforcement provision of the Violence Against 
Women Act). 
 229. The theory that federalism is adequately protected by “political safeguards,” and therefore 
requires no more than very deferential judicial review, was articulated by a five-Justice majority in 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 550-52 (1985), and reasserted by 
the dissenters in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 647-52 (espousing “[t]he Garcia Court’s rejection of ‘judicially 
created limitations’ in favor of the intended reliance on national politics”).  The Morrison majority 
rejected this theory in overruling Garcia: “No doubt the political branches have a role in interpreting 
and applying the Constitution, but ever since Marbury this Court has remained the ultimate expositor 
of the constitutional text.”  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 n.7.  The majority found the “political safeguards” 
theory to be “remarkable because it undermines this central principle of our constitutional system.”  Id. 
 230. Reliance by private parties is, of course, another rationale for stare decisis in general, but it 
does not supply a reason for a special, strong rule of stare decisis in statutory interpretation cases.  In 
the case of Southland, the argument based on reliance by private parties is further weakened by the 
Supreme Court’s contention that arbitration does not affect substantive rights.  See Allied-Bruce, 513 
U.S. at 284-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 231. Id. at 272. 
 232. See supra text accompanying notes 192-96. 
 233. See supra text accompanying notes 116-19, 156-62, 187.  Again, Bernhardt held that the FAA 
was substantive only insofar as a procedural rule can be deemed “outcome determinative” for the pur-
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Justice Brandeis wrote in dissent from another statutory interpretation deci-
sion that stare decisis “is not an inexorable command.  The instances in which 
the court has disregarded its admonition are many.”234  Fourteen years later, a 
majority of the Court would join Brandeis in the twentieth century’s most 
famous example of the Court overruling a statutory precedent.  Because the 
holding is known as overruling the doctrine of general federal common law, it is 
easy to overlook the fact that Erie, in overruling Swift, reversed Swift’s interpre-
tation of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789—an interpretation that had 
stood for ninety-six years. 
The comparison to Erie here is more to the point than one might suppose.  
A special justification to overrule a statutory precedent might well be present 
when, on reconsideration, a constitutional question is raised by the Court’s 
prior interpretation.  That was the rationale in Erie, in which the Court con-
cluded that the judicial interpretation given to section 34 by Swift—not the stat-
ute itself—was unconstitutional because it allowed the federal courts to make 
law on subjects outside the legislative power of Congress.  Southland held that a 
state statute “violate[d] the Supremacy Clause” and was void because it con-
flicted with section 2 of the FAA.  This displacement of state law—a judicial act 
that is itself of constitutional significance235—was based on an erroneous inter-
pretation of the FAA as substantive rather than procedural law. 
Southland took up the invitation in Moses H. Cone to view the FAA as an 
authorization for federal courts to create “a body of federal substantive law” 
along the lines of the federal common law of labor arbitration pursuant to the 
LMRA.236  If the FAA was intended to be—or is now fundamentally—
procedural law, its use as a basis for the creation of federal law that preempts 
state lawmaking is constitutionally problematic under Erie.  Any Justice who 
sees the FAA in that light would have a “special justification” to overrule 
Southland, a justification that is in one important sense stronger than the one in 
 
poses of Erie.  Prima Paint held that procedural but outcome determinative rules could be enacted 
under the commerce power without offending Erie. 
 234. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  “Not-
withstanding the rule [of statutory stare decisis], the Supreme Court . . . overruled or materially modi-
fied statutory precedents more than eighty times” between 1961 and 1988.  Eskridge, supra note 220, at 
1363, 1427-39.  One need not look beyond the FAA to find examples of the Court overruling statutory 
interpretation precedents.  See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989), 
overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).  In addition, the Court has overruled two statutory inter-
pretation doctrines that had gained unanimous or near-unanimous agreement among the courts of 
appeals.  See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 655-56 (1985) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the majority opinion overruled the unanimous view of the 
courts of appeals that antitrust claims are not arbitrable); Schwartz, supra note 52, at 93-94, 103-04 
(noting that Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Co., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), overruled the near-unanimous 
view of the lower courts that employment discrimination claims are not arbitrable). 
 235. It is commonplace to relegate preemption decisions to the realm of statutory interpretation, but 
there is an undeniable constitutional dimension to a court’s holding that a state statute is void on pre-
emption grounds.  In that sense, the Southland majority was quite right to couch its holding in the con-
stitutional terms of the Supremacy Clause. 
 236. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
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Erie.  Although arbitration is narrower in scope than the general federal law 
considered in Erie, its effect on the states goes deeper: federal common law 
under Swift was not applicable in state courts, and technically (if not always 
perfectly in practice), state statutes could in effect overrule federal common law 
decisions.  But the federal common law of the FAA binds state courts and 
nullifies state statutes. 
A Supreme Court truly interested in federalism should, like the Court in 
Erie, look very carefully at any sweeping claims that an act of Congress has 
broadly authorized the courts to create a body of federal common law.  Here, 
Moses H. Cone found such authority in the FAA by analogy to the lawmaking 
authority over labor arbitration the federal courts have derived from section 
301 of the LMRA.237  But that analogy is unsound.  Unlike arbitration agree-
ments governed by federal labor law, private contractual arbitration agreements 
were not seen by the Congress that passed the FAA as being of special federal 
concern; that is to say, Congress evinced a concern only to bring such agree-
ments into general contract law, not to lift them out of it and into a special, pro-
tected category.238  Collective bargaining agreements, on the other hand, 
although private contracts in form, have long been regarded as contracts 
carrying national public-policy implications due to the history of labor strife.239  
Nationwide unions and the major impact of labor relations on interstate com-
merce were specifically noted in the legislative histories and the provisions of 
both the LMRA and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).240  Such con-
gressional expressions of national policy imply a need for uniformity that may 
well justify the making of federal common law, but these seem wholly absent 
from the FAA. 
In this light, Southland’s interpretation of the FAA is constitutionally dubi-
ous.  Congress’s power to dictate state procedures for the resolution of federal 
claims is limited and subject to some doubt.241  The FAA, under Southland, 
 
 237. See supra text accompanying note 214. 
 238. The FAA “places such agreements to arbitrate on the same footing as other contracts.” H.R. 
REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924); accord Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 
n.12 (1967) (“[T]he purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as 
other contracts, but not more so.”). 
 239. See supra notes 203-04, 214-15 and accompanying text. 
 240. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-58, 159-67, 171-83, 185-87, 557 
(2000); Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000); 93 CONG. REC. 6600 (1947) (state-
ment of Sen. Taft); 93 CONG. REC. 3656-57 (1947). 
 241. In the absence of a state rule that uniquely burdens a federal “right of recovery” by imposing 
particular procedural obstacles, it is doubtful whether any federal power exists at all to control neutral 
state procedures in federal question cases.  See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 919 (1997) (holding 
that a neutral state rule denying interlocutory appeals was not preempted by a federal rule allowing 
such appeals for § 1983 defendants); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990) (“[F]ederal law [nor-
mally] takes the state courts as it finds them.”); see also Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption: The 
Proposed Federalization of State Court Procedures, 44 VILL. L. REV. 1, 42-52 (1999) (canvassing feder-
alism problems in federal regulation of state court procedures).  Since this Article was substantially 
completed, I have come to the conclusion and argued elsewhere that Southland’s rule of FAA preemp-
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amounts to a restructuring of state judicial processes on the procedural question 
of forum selection, even for purely state-law claims.  Where state-court cases 
are concerned, the choice is between litigating before judges in a state-court 
system or before an arbitrator in a conference room in a private office suite.  In 
other areas in which Congress has displaced state adjudicative processes 
through statutes either granting federal courts exclusive jurisdiction, such as the 
Securities Exchange Act,242 or creating national tribunals, such as the NLRA,243 
the displacement is (or should be) justified by a set of substantive policies 
deemed suitable for uniform, national treatment.244  Even if one were tempted 
to argue that the FAA creates a substantive rule of contract interpretation—
that arbitration agreements will always be enforced despite contrary state poli-
cies—no substantive subject matter underlies the law, which deals only with the 
forum choice.  The notion that a strong, substantive federal interest must be 
present to justify the preemption of state law is a corollary of the doctrine of 
enumerated powers.  That a statute dealing fundamentally with procedure 
would preempt state law, or that an act of Congress would regulate state courts 
on a matter of procedure under the Commerce Clause seems constitutionally 
problematic.245 
To be sure, overcrowded state-court dockets may well spill over onto federal 
dockets, and it would be easy for Congress to make a case that state dispute-
resolution systems “affect interstate commerce.” Perhaps—though it seems 
doubtful—Congress has the power to dictate at least some terms about how 
states must structure their judicial or dispute-resolution systems.  Yet, were 
Congress to make such a major intrusion into state autonomy based on so very 
weak a federal interest, this would at minimum raise a serious constitutional 
 
tion is unconstitutional.  See David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of Congress 
over State Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). 
 242. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000). 
 243. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2000) (creating the National Labor Relations Board). 
 244. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 383 (1996) (“We may presume, how-
ever, that Congress intended § 27 to serve at least the general purposes underlying most grants of 
exclusive jurisdiction: to achieve greater uniformity of construction and more effective and expert 
application of that law.”) (quotations omitted); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 
236, 241-42 (1959) (describing the overriding need for uniform national labor policy to justify the pre-
emptive primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board). 
 245. Is it supportable for the Court to use the FAA as a point of departure for a “national judicial 
policy favoring arbitration”?  Might it not be said that federal courts, as a matter of separation of 
powers, should be allowed to fire a shot across the bow of a Congress that it may feel is creating too 
much work for the federal courts (in the form of new causes of action) while being laggard in filling 
judicial vacancies? Cf. Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court’s Anti-
Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 454-58 (2001) (arguing that this separation-of-powers motive 
explains much of the “new federalism”).  Wholly apart from Southland’s premise that the FAA reflects 
a congressional pro-arbitration policy enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause (and not Article III), 
the federal judicial interest in imposing a procedural policy on the states does not seem any stronger 
than the congressional interest.  The impact of state-court dockets on federal dockets is indirect.  It is 
one thing for federal courts to bar their own courthouse doors to litigants, but quite another to bar the 
doors of state courts.  In any event, Gregory and the federalism revival suggest that the Court is to be a 
guardian of federalism rather than a source of anti-federalism policy. 
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question.  The Court should apply a heavy presumption against giving the FAA 
such an interpretation.246  Thus, even if Southland is not unconstitutional, its 
interpretation of the FAA raises serious, unaddressed constitutional doubts.  
Southland should be overruled. 
VII 
RECONSTRUCTING THE FAA 
If Southland were overruled, what doctrine would replace it?  Three plausi-
ble interpretations of the FAA emerge from the historical record and the vari-
ous dissents. 
A. Stevens’s Southland Dissent 
Justice Stevens argued in Southland that the FAA leaves room for the states 
to create specific public policy exceptions to what he sees as the FAA’s other-
wise general rule of arbitration enforcement.  Essentially, this interpretation 
accepts the Southland majority’s position that the FAA is substantive law 
binding on the states, but gives a broader reading to the savings clause than did 
the majority.  Rather than being limited to generic state-law contract defenses, 
the section 2 savings clause’s reference to “grounds that exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract” would include the ground that contracts 
against public policy are void.  “I believe that [the savings clause] leaves room 
for the implementation of certain substantive state policies that would be 
undermined by enforcing certain categories of arbitration clauses.”247  Under 
this view, a state could determine that a judicial forum should be preserved for 
certain types of claims, though a state law invalidating arbitration agreements 
across the board would be preempted. 
This interpretation shares the flaw of the majority opinion by assuming that 
the FAA creates a substantive right enforceable in state court.  It does, how-
ever, have the virtue of offering a plausible interpretation of the savings clause 
that attempts to take state sovereignty into account and to reduce the FAA’s 
preemptive scope.  Moreover, the Stevens approach suggests that a state law 
barring predispute arbitration agreements in certain contexts—such as the pro-
vision of the California Labor Code considered in Southland—is also substan-
 
 246. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991); supra text accompanying notes 49-51.  The 
long-established principle of constitutional avoidance also supports construing the FAA to avoid con-
stitutionally dubious preemption of state law.  “If a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one 
involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction of general law, the 
Court will decide only the latter.”  Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring).  Thus, “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise seri-
ous constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such con-
struction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”  Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001).  The Court has failed to apply this principle in the Southland line of cases. 
 247. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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tive, and therefore, under Erie, should be enforceable even in federal court, in 
diversity and ancillary jurisdiction cases. 248 
B. The O’Connor-Scalia-Thomas Position 
Justice O’Connor in Southland and Justices Scalia and Thomas in Allied-
Bruce argued that the FAA is a rule of procedure applicable only in federal 
court.249  This interpretation gives due regard to federalism concerns and is true 
to the original intent of the FAA.  It also is consistent with the language of the 
statute and with the Court’s decisions holding arbitration enforcement to be a 
procedural right that is not outcome determinative.  Finally, it would reconcile 
the arbitration-enforcement right with the statute’s clearly implied withholding 
of subject matter jurisdiction.  Adopting the O’Connor-Scalia-Thomas position 
would entail overruling Southland as well as the language in Moses H. Cone 
asserting that the FAA creates substantive federal law. 
This “procedural FAA” approach need not give rise to an Erie problem.  In 
the absence of Southland, the FAA’s applicability in federal diversity cases 
would be sanctioned by Prima Paint’s holding that federal court procedure may 
be governed by any statute within the power of Congress without triggering the 
Erie analysis outlined in Hanna v. Plumer.  Ironically, this approach might leave 
less of an entree for state law in federal court, via the savings clause, than the 
Stevens approach.  If the enforcement of arbitration agreements were deemed a 
question of procedure, even one that is outcome determinative, then there 
would be an argument that state policies restricting arbitration in certain classes 
of cases—those that Justice Stevens would import via the savings clause—are 
procedural and therefore would not apply in federal court. 
C. The Savings Clause Interpretation 
The substance/procedure distinction is not, of course, an end in itself, but a 
way of analyzing and deciding the extent of the FAA’s application.  Conceiva-
bly, the drafters of the Act and the Congress that passed it concerned them-
selves with the substance/procedure distinction only as a means to an end—to 
navigate doctrinal objections that might be given credence in the courts.  Espe-
cially in light of the double-turnaround of 1938,250 the intent of Congress that the 
FAA be deemed substantive or procedural should matter less than the answer 
one reaches to two fundamental questions: First, does the FAA preempt state 
law?  Second, if not, what room does it leave for state law in the federal courts? 
 
 248. Id. at 19-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 249. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284-85 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
id. at 285-96 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Southland, 465 U.S. at 21-36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 250. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect in 1938, the same year as the Erie deci-
sion.  “To oversimplify the transformation: Before 1938 the federal courts in diversity cases applied 
federal substantive law through state procedure (except in equity cases); after 1938 they applied state 
substantive law through federal procedure.” JAMES FLEMING & GEOFFREY HAZARD, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE § 2.35, at 119 (3d ed. 1985). 
SCHWARTZ_GLOBAL.FMT.DOC 10/14/2004  10:22 AM 
52 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 67:5 
The answer to the first question is clear: Congress had no intention when it 
enacted the FAA in 1925 to preempt any state law, not even a state statute like 
Alabama’s, which refused enforcement of all predispute arbitration agreements.  
Any policies and case law developments that have arisen since 1925 are suffi-
ciently counterbalanced by the federalism concerns espoused by the Court over 
the past decade to justify a refusal to depart from Congress’s original intent on 
this point. 
The answer to the second question leaves more room for disagreement.  
Clearly, the savings clause preserves substantive law relating to the validity and 
revocability of contracts.  In 1925, this would have meant federal decisional law 
and state statutes under the Swift regime; since Erie, it should mean state deci-
sional law and state statutes.  The more difficult question is what else the 
savings clause covers.  The Supreme Court has construed it to refer only to 
“generally applicable” contract law.251  But this interpretation is unduly narrow.  
First, it gives rise to an ongoing ambiguity.  “General contract law” doctrines, 
such as unconscionability, are only meaningful when applied to specific situa-
tions: an arbitration agreement may be unconscionable even though other terms 
of the same contract are not.  Second, as the Stevens interpretation points out, 
the “general contract law” interpretation prevents the application of state poli-
cies preserving a judicial forum for certain categories of cases. 
Even Justice Stevens’s view is too narrow.  According to Justice Stevens, a 
state policy expressing “general hostility” to arbitration conflicts with the FAA.  
But the FAA was enacted to overrule the ouster doctrine and decisional law 
declining specific enforcement and stays of litigation.  The “old judicial hostil-
ity” to arbitration agreements was based on judicial assertions of the power of 
courts—that it was against public policy to enforce private agreements depriv-
ing or “ousting” courts of jurisdiction.  The ouster doctrine was not based on 
substantive contract law relating to contract formation and defenses, but was 
rather a judicial policy governing jurisdiction and judicial administration.  An 
anti-arbitration policy based on contract law is different.  For example, a state 
legislature or court might determine that given the nature of the rights waived 
and the disparity between the parties in information and bargaining power, 
predispute arbitration agreements are always unconscionable as a matter of law.  
As long as an arbitration-specific regulation is based on such concerns, which 
are general contract-law concerns applied to the specific case of arbitration 
agreements, rather than on the judicial power concerns underlying the ouster 
doctrine, the state rule should be deemed saved within the savings clause.  Such 
state-law doctrines should not only be saved from preemption in state-court 
cases but should also be applied (at least to state-law claims) in federal court via 
the savings clause. 
This broad reading of the savings clause finds support in two further 
respects.  First, it is consistent with the existing doctrine that general contract-
 
 251. Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). 
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law defenses are applicable to invalidate an arbitration agreement.  After all, 
such doctrines as unconscionability, duress, mistake, and the like must be 
applied to a specific case involving an arbitration agreement.  There is no rea-
son that a court should be allowed to apply general contract-law principles to an 
arbitration agreement in a specific case while a legislature or court is forbidden 
from doing so in a class of cases.  The distinction is hard to justify.  Second, this 
broad reading of the savings clause is consistent with a federalism-based 
statutory interpretation.  Although “Congress may legislate in areas tradition-
ally regulated by the States” when it acts within its enumerated powers, “Con-
gress does not exercise [this power] lightly.”252 
D. The End of Arbitration? 
Overruling Southland would correct a mistake of statutory interpretation 
and eliminate the intense contradiction between FAA preemption of state law 
and the federalism principles espoused by the Supreme Court over the past 
decade.  It would not spell the end of arbitration—not even compelled predis-
pute arbitration.  Most states have arbitration statutes and judicially created 
pro-arbitration policies similar to those under federal law.  State statutes pre-
serving a judicial forum exist only in a minority of states for a minority of 
claims.  At the same time, the presumption that statutory claims are arbitrable 
would not be implicated by overruling Southland.253  Some might argue that 
overruling Southland’s imposition of a uniform, national rule would produce 
judicial inefficiencies.  Such blanket efficiency arguments are always present 
when states exercise regulatory autonomy in our fifty-state federal system, and 
they almost never take seriously the cost of such “efficiency” on federalism 
values.  To be sure, overruling Southland, and thus reviving the various state 
laws precluding arbitration for certain types of claims, would create some pro-
cedural complexities in the form of more cases involving both arbitrable and 
nonarbitrable claims, though some exist even under current law.  In federal 
court, two factors might limit the potential for increased procedural maneuver-
ing.  First, FAA doctrine provides that arbitrable claims must be arbitrated 
before nonarbitrable claims are adjudicated.254  Second, because overruling 
Southland would on the whole revive state courts as a forum for claims, there 
might be a reduction of federal filings.  Plaintiffs in many instances might 
pursue state-law claims and forego federal claims to avoid removal to a federal 
forum, where arbitration would be compelled.  If the increased judicial business 
created a problem for states, that could be handled by the appropriate state 
legislatures.  That is, after all, how the federal system is supposed to work. 
 
 252. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). 
 253. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31-34 (1991) (citing cases); Schwartz, 
supra note 52, at 95-104 (summarizing the case law holding statutory claims arbitrable). 
 254. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220-21 (1985). 
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VIII 
CONCLUSION 
Southland and its progeny are the result of bad statutory interpretation and 
even worse federalism.  The historical evidence demonstrates that Congress 
never intended to preempt state law regulating arbitration agreements.  To the 
contrary, the best interpretation of the FAA is that, by virtue of its savings 
clause, federal courts should normally be bound by state-law restrictions on arbi-
tration enforcement.  The evidence against Southland is so strong that it seems 
that no one defends it on the merits anymore: Southland lives on only because 
of the Court’s reluctance to overrule a statutory interpretation precedent, its 
desire to spread arbitration far and wide, or a combination of the two.  Neither 
justifies continuing the regime of Southland’s preemption of state law. 
In Southland, the Court made an error of constitutional proportions that is 
in significant respects comparable to the error of Swift v. Tyson, which the 
Court famously corrected in Erie.  The Southland decision itself was the out-
growth of a series of misapplications of the Erie doctrine to the FAA combined 
with the vestiges of a judicial nationalism that mistakenly tethered the FAA to 
federal labor policy and that was already on the decline when Southland was 
decided.  The doctrine created by Southland intrudes heavily on state sover-
eignty by preempting numerous state efforts to regulate abuses associated with 
arbitration agreements.  At the same time, Southland authorizes the creation of 
a body of federal common law that, while not as broad in subject matter as that 
created by the federal courts under Swift, cuts deeper into state sovereignty 
because of its preemptive effect.  And whatever one’s views on the desirability 
of arbitration as a form of alternative dispute resolution, the FAA’s preemptive 
effect under Southland is unsupported by any significant federal interest.  In 
sharp contrast with the federal common law of arbitration in the labor setting—
based on a perceived need for national uniformity to promote industrial peace 
between nationwide unions and employers—Congress has no particular interest 
in directing the intrastate forum choice between arbitration and a state court. 
Stare decisis notwithstanding, the court should not leave it to Congress to 
correct the mistake of Southland.  If the Court is credibly to claim a significant 
role for itself in safeguarding the federal system from overreaching by Con-
gress, the Court should not abdicate its federalism-enforcing role when the mis-
take is of its own making. 
